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Cited by 2,592Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesBehavioral Health and Interventions

All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects

Levin, Irwin P., Schneider, Sandra L., Gaeth, Gary J.·1998·Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
DOI 10.1006/obhd.1998.2804
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Abstract

Accentuate the positive or accentuate the negative? The literature has been mixed as to how the alternative framing of information in positive or negative terms affects judgments and decisions. We argue that this is because different studies have employed different operational definitions of framing and thus have tapped different underlying processes. We develop a typology to distinguish between three different kinds of valence framing effects. First we discuss the standard risky choice framing effect introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to illustrate how valence affects willingness to take a risk. Then we discuss attribute framing, which affects the evaluation of object or event characteristics, and goal framing, which affects the persuasiveness of a communication. We describe the distinctions, provide a number of examples of each type, and discuss likely theoretical mechanisms underlying each type of framing effect. Our typology helps explain and resolve apparent confusions in the literature, ties together studies with common underlying mechanisms, and serves as a guide to future research and theory development. We conclude that a broader perspective, focused on the cognitive and motivational consequences of valence-based encoding, opens the door to a deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of framing effects. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.

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  • Prospect theory demonstrates that a decision maker's perceived utility can be subjectively influenced by the manner in which the information is framed (as a loss/gain or risk/no risk), what reference is being used to evaluate the options, and the relationship/salience of the alternative to the decision maker.

    “Prospect theory, however, demonstrates that a decision maker's perceived utility can be subjectively influenced by the manner in which the information is framed (as a loss/gain or risk/no risk), what reference is being used to evaluate the options, and the relationship/salience of the alternative to the decision maker [47,70-74].”

    From Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers (2010) · cites this paper as [71]

  • The utilization of heuristics in decision making is a robust source of influence in the assessment and judgment of decision options, such as the likelihood of contracting a disease, identifying probabilities of accidental fatalities, information identification, and pharmaceutical risk.

    “The utilization of heuristics in decision making has been shown to be a robust source of influence in the assessment and judgment of decision options, such as the likelihood of contracting a disease, identifying probabilities of accidental fatalities, information identification, and pharmaceutical risk [66,71,73,75].”

    From Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers (2010) · cites this paper as [71]

  • Heuristics are cognitive processes where full information processing requirements are bypassed and mental shortcutting occurs.

    “Heuristics are cognitive processes where full information processing requirements are bypassed and mental shortcutting occurs [66,71,73,94].”

    From Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers (2010) · cites this paper as [71]

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Authors
Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Iowa (US)
  • University of South Florida (US)
Corresponding author
Levin, Irwin P.
ORCID
Venue
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1998-11
Volume
76
Issue
2
Pages
149-188
ISSN
0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1006/obhd.1998.2804
OpenAlex
W2080612551
Cited by
2,592
References
134
Citations by year
2026: 105 · 2025: 151 · 2024: 138 · 2023: 125 · 2022: 159 · 2021: 165 · 2020: 180 · 2019: 147 · 2018: 111 · 2017: 114 · 2016: 124 · 2015: 151 · 2014: 103 · 2013: 116 · 2012: 102
FWCI
11.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Commons - University of South Florida (University of South Florida) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
Keywords
framing effects, valence framing, positive and negative framing, decision making under risk, attribute framing, goal framing, persuasion, risk-taking

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