Cited by 81Fiscal Policies and Political EconomyGlobal Financial Crisis and PoliciesMonetary Policy and Economic Impact

Elections and the timing of devaluations

Open access
Stein, Ernesto H., Streb, Jorge M.·2004·Journal of International Economics

Abstract

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model where devaluation acts as a tax on consumption due to a cash-in-advance constraint. Competent governments can signal their competency by reducing the rate of devaluation prior to elections. When voters also ignore the degree to which governments are opportunistic, i.e. the extent to which they are willing to distort the economy for electoral gain, an incompetent, opportunistic incumbent can reduce the rate of devaluation in the run-up to an election. The main theoretical implication in either setup, that the rate of devaluation is significantly higher in the months following an election, is consistent with evidence drawn from 26 countries in Latin America.

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00040-0

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  • The experimental setup resembles the setup with two-dimensional asymmetric information in Stein and Streb (2004).

    “This setup resembles the setup with two-dimensional asymmetric information inStein and StrebStreb (2004)”

    From Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment (2021) · cites this paper as Stein and StrebStreb (2004)

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5 of the 40 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Atkinson, Anthony, and Joseph Stiglitz, 1980, Lectures on public economics, New York: McGraw-Hill.
  2. Heymann, Daniel, 1991, 'From sharp disinflation to hyperinflation, twice: the Argentina experience', in Michael Bruno et al., eds., Lessons of Economic Stabilization and its Aftermath, Cambridge: MIT Press.
  3. Nordhaus, William, 1975, 'The political business cycle', Review of Economic Studies 42, 169-190.
  4. Svenson, Lars, 1983, 'Money and asset prices in cash-in-advance economies', Journal of Political Economy 93, 914-944.
  5. Weinschelbaum, Federico, 1998, 'The triangle of corruption', Ph.D dissertation, UCLA.

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Authors
Stein, E. H., & Streb, J. M.
Affiliations
  • Inter-American Development Bank (US)
  • Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (AR)
Corresponding author
Streb, Jorge M.
Venue
Journal of International Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2004-05
Volume
63
Issue
1
Pages
119-145
ISSN
0022-1996 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2162223422
Cited by
81
References
40
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 6
FWCI
7.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of International Economics (publishedVersion)
  • Económica (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Americanae (AECID Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Crisis and Policies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
Keywords
political budget cycles, currency devaluation, elections, government competence, cash-in-advance constraint, consumption tax, voting behavior, Latin America

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