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Cited by 548

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives

Open access
Brickley, James A., Linck, James S., Coles, Jeffrey L.·1999·Journal of Financial Economics

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Retention on the CEO's own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidence also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members.

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4

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Metadata

Authors
Brickley, J. A., Linck, J. S., & Coles, J. L.
Venue
Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1999-06
Volume
52
Issue
3
Pages
341-377
ISSN
0304-405X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3123745079
Cited by
548
References
22
FWCI
44.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4
The paper
Brickley, J. A., Linck, J. S., & Coles, J. L. (1999). What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.