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Cited by 2,401

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A Theory of Friendly Boards

Open access
ADAMS, RENÉE B., FERREIRA, DANIEL·2007·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x
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Abstract

We analyze the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade‐off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor him more intensively. Since an independent board is a tougher monitor, the CEO may be reluctant to share information with it. Thus, management‐friendly boards can be optimal. Using the insights from the model, we analyze the differences between sole and dual board systems. We highlight several policy implications of our analysis.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 4 references

Research works printed but not linked: 25

  1. 10.1111/1540-6261.00536 · DOI
  2. 10.1111/1468-0262.00336 · DOI · Paper page
  3. Brefort Loup, 2002, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China
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  5. Clarke Thomas, 1997, Corporate Governance
  6. Committee on Corporate Laws, 1994, Corporate Directors Guidebook
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  9. 10.1257/jep.10.3.103 · DOI · Paper page
  10. 10.1162/1542476042782260 · DOI · Paper page
  11. Hermalin Benjamin E., 1998, Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO, American Economic Review, 88, 96
  12. Hermalin Benjamin E., 2003, Boards of directors as an endogenously‐determined institution: A survey of the economic literature, Economic Policy Review, 9, 7
  13. 10.1162/00335530151144159 · DOI · Paper page
  14. Lorsch Jay W., 1989, Pawns or Potentates
  15. Monks Robert A. G., 1996, Watching the Watchers
  16. Morck Randall 2004 Behavioral finance in corporate governance: Independent directors and non‐executive chairs Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper n. 2037. · DOI
  17. 10.2307/2393237 · DOI · Paper page
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  19. O'Hare Sean, 2003, Splitting the board by stealth, The Financial Times
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  25. 10.1016/S0929-1199(97)00009-6 · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(97)00009-6

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Metadata

Authors
ADAMS, R. B., & FERREIRA, D.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2007-01-11
Volume
62
Issue
1
Pages
217-250
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x
OpenAlex
W3123468997
Cited by
2,401
References
4
FWCI
271.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Theory of Friendly Boards. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x
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ADAMS, R. B., & FERREIRA, D. (2007). A Theory of Friendly Boards. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.