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Cited by 261

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 91 of the 91 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning

Open access
Goldvarg, E·2001·Cognitive Science

Abstract

Abstract This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the first and last of these possibilities. Individuals represent these relations in mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. The theory predicts a number of phenomena, and, contrary to many accounts, it implies that the meaning of causation is not probabilistic, differs from the meaning of enabling conditions, and does not depend on causal powers or mechanisms. The theory also implies that causal deductions do not depend on schemas or rules.

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Metadata

Authors
Goldvarg, E.
Venue
Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001-08
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
565-610
ISSN
0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2132957878
Cited by
261
References
91
FWCI
4.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0364-0213(01)00046-5
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Goldvarg, E. (2001). Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. Cognitive Science. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0364-0213(01)00046-5

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.