The DOI matches its Crossref record; 91 of the 91 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning
Open accessAbstract
Abstract This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the first and last of these possibilities. Individuals represent these relations in mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. The theory predicts a number of phenomena, and, contrary to many accounts, it implies that the meaning of causation is not probabilistic, differs from the meaning of enabling conditions, and does not depend on causal powers or mechanisms. The theory also implies that causal deductions do not depend on schemas or rules.
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Cites
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Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
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Judgment under uncertainty: List of contributors
Kahneman, D. J., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982) · Cited by 4,670
Judgment under uncertainty: Causality and attribution
Kahneman, D. J., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982) · Cited by 4,670
Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness
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The processes of causal attribution.
Kelley, H. H. (1973) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0034225 · Cited by 4,025 · cited 2×
“The idea goes back to Kelley’s (1973) theory of causal attribution, which postulated such schemas for checking causal relations. Morris & Nisbett (1993), for example, formulated a schema that includes the following two rules:”
BackgroundNorm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Cited by
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x08003543 · Cited by 1,174
Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.109.4.646 · Cited by 861
Wolff, P., & Barbey, A. K. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00001 · Cited by 788
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677
Structure and strength in causal induction☆
Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2005) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.05.004 · Cited by 612
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldvarg, E.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-08
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 565-610
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2132957878
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 91
- FWCI
- 4.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.