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The intentionality of intention and action
Abstract
Cognitive Science is likely to make little progress in the study of human behavior until we have a clear account of what a human action is. The aim of this paper is to present a sketch of a theory of action. I will locate the relation of intention to action within a general theory of Intentionality. I will introduce a distinction between prior intentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally selfreferential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they enable me to suggest solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordian effect, basic actions, etc.), to show how the logical structure of intentional action is strikingly like the logical structure of perceptions, and to construct an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.
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Citations
Cited by
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
Self-citationEcological laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981)
Turvey, M. T., Shaw, R. E., Reed, E. S., & Mace, W. M. (1981) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(81)90002-0 · Cited by 679
Is blindsight an effect of scattered light, spared cortex, and near-threshold vision?
Campion, J., Latto, R., & Smith, Y. M. (1983) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00016861 · Cited by 413
Searle, J. R. (1997) · Mind Design II · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4626.003.0007 · Cited by 329
Self-citationPatherie, E. (2000) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00142 · Cited by 159
Metadata
- Authors
- SEARLE, J.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1981-03
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 47-70
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W163640547
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- SEARLE, J. (1981). The intentionality of intention and action. Cognitive Science. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0364-0213(81)80004-3
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.