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Cited by 213

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information

Open access
Trester, Jeffrey J.·1998·Journal of Banking & Finance

Abstract

A model is developed wherein entrepreneurs and venture capitalists contract under symmetric information. Asymmetric information may arise following first contracting. It is shown this can lead to debt infeasibility and preferred equity usage. Control is linked to choice between common and preferred. Results are robust to multiperiod extensions. Roles of convertible preferred, retained equity, and debt in IPOs are considered. An empirical survey of venture capital firms is presented demonstrating preferred dominates in early financing. Debt and common are used far less – generally at later stages under lower probability of asymmetric information. These results agree with the theory's implications.

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Metadata

Authors
Trester, J. J.
Venue
Journal of Banking & Finance
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1998-08
Volume
22
Issue
6-8
Pages
675-699
ISSN
0378-4266 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2096185858
Cited by
213
References
2
FWCI
25.11
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00013-2
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Trester, J. J. (1998). Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information. Journal of Banking & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00013-2

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.