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Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information
Open accessAbstract
A model is developed wherein entrepreneurs and venture capitalists contract under symmetric information. Asymmetric information may arise following first contracting. It is shown this can lead to debt infeasibility and preferred equity usage. Control is linked to choice between common and preferred. Results are robust to multiperiod extensions. Roles of convertible preferred, retained equity, and debt in IPOs are considered. An empirical survey of venture capital firms is presented demonstrating preferred dominates in early financing. Debt and common are used far less – generally at later stages under lower probability of asymmetric information. These results agree with the theory's implications.
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Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Cited by
N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00038-7 · Cited by 3,690
“…1994, Gompers 1995, Bergemann and Hege 1998),'7 control and the choice of equity/debt instrument (Gompers 1993, Marx 1993, Comelli and Yosha 1997, Trester 1998), entrepreneur compensation (Sahlman 1990), restrictive covenants (Chan, Siegel, and Thakor 1990, Gompers and Lemer 1996), board…”
Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning
Bergemann, D., & Hege, U. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00017-x · Cited by 727
Serial Crowdfunding, Social Capital, and Project Success
Butticè, V., Colombo, M. G., & Wright, M. (2017) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/etap.12271 · Cited by 425
A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits
Cumming, D. J., & MacIntosh, J. G. (2003) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00389-8 · Cited by 372
Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach
Repullo, R., & Suarez, J. (2004) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1023/b:eufi.0000022158.96140.f8 · Cited by 345
Metadata
- Authors
- Trester, J. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-08
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 6-8
- Pages
- 675-699
- ISSN
- 0378-4266 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096185858
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 25.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Trester, J. J. (1998). Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information. Journal of Banking & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00013-2
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.