Cited by 259Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsGame Theory and Applications

Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games

Goeree, Jacob K., Holt, Charles A., Palfrey, Thomas R.·2003·Games and Economic Behavior

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00052-6

Cites

32 of 32 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Attacking rivals expected to have strong defenses more likely results in failure and waste than attacking groups expected to be weak and defenseless.

    “attacking rivals who are expected to have strong defenses more likely results in failure and waste, than attacking groups expected to be weak and defenseless (De Dreu et al., 2016b; Grossman and Kim, 2002; Goeree et al., 2003).”

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Authors
Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A., & Palfrey, T. R.
Affiliations
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • University of Virginia (US)
  • California Institute of Technology (US)
Corresponding author
Palfrey, Thomas R.
Venue
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003-10
Volume
45
Issue
1
Pages
97-113
ISSN
0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2145115072
Cited by
258
References
33
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 13
FWCI
20.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
  • CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
risk aversion, mixed strategy equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, structural econometric model, 2×2 games, experimental game theory

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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