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Cited by 226Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

The Long-Term Benefits of Human Generosity in Indirect Reciprocity

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Wedekind, Claus, Braithwaite, Victoria A·2002·Current Biology
DOI 10.1016/s0960-9822(02)00890-4
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Abstract

Among the theories that have been proposed to explain the evolution of altruism are direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity. The idea of the latter is that helping someone or refusing to do so has an impact on one's reputation within a group. This reputation is constantly assessed and reassessed by others and is taken into account by them in future social interactions. Generosity in indirect reciprocity can evolve if and only if it eventually leads to a net benefit in the long term. Here, we show that this key assumption is met. We let 114 students play for money in an indirect and a subsequent direct reciprocity game. We found that although being generous, i.e., giving something of value to others, had the obvious short-term costs, it paid in the long run because it builds up a reputation that is rewarded by third parties (who thereby themselves increase their reputation). A reputation of being generous also provided an advantage in the subsequent direct reciprocity game, probably because it builds up trust that can lead to more stable cooperation.

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2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Self-awareness of being observed heightens the need to cooperate with rules.

    “Therefore, self-awareness of being observed heightens the need to cooperate with rules (Barclay 2004; Milinski et al. 2002; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002).”

    From Paradoxical effects of self-awareness of being observed: testing the effect of police body-worn cameras on assaults and aggression against officers (2018) · cites this paper as Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002

  • People are nicer to others if third parties were nicer to them.

    “People are nicer to others if third parties were nicer to them.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [63]

  • Several experiments show that even players who know that their score will not be communicated show generous behaviour.

    “But several experiments show that even players who know that their score will not be communicated show generous behaviour 61,63 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [63]

  • In experimental situations which are not based on rigid networks, the decisions of donors also tend to mirror their own recent experience.

    “In experimental situations which are not based on rigid networks, the decisions of donors also tend to mirror their own recent experience 58,63 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [63]

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Authors
Wedekind, C., & Braithwaite, V. A.
Affiliations
University of Edinburgh (GB)
Corresponding author
Wedekind, Claus
ORCID
Wedekind, Claus
Venue
Current Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2002-06
Volume
12
Issue
12
Pages
1012-1015
ISSN
0960-9822 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/s0960-9822(02)00890-4
OpenAlex
W2075742750
Cited by
226
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 10
FWCI
18.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Current Biology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
indirect reciprocity, direct reciprocity, evolution of altruism, generosity, reputation, trust, cooperation, long-term benefits
MeSH terms
Altruism, Games, Experimental, Humans, Time

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