The DOI matches its Crossref record; 279 of the 279 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The folk psychology of souls
Abstract
The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is “like” to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive “system” dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.
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“The supernatural monitoring hypothesis posits that religious systems with beliefs that supernatural agents are unseen observers to their every action creates a sense of being constantly observed, thus leading believers to err on the side of caution by avoiding antisocial behaviour, just in case (Johnson 2009; Bering 2006).”
From Cultural Evolution of Religion, Spirituality and Ritual: Impacts On Human Cooperation (2024) · cites this paper as Bering 2006
In the citing paper
“Empirical evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive science indicates that many elements of religious beliefs arise early in development, and are stably present across cultures”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Bering, 2006
Citations
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“Because of the risks associated with social detection of selfish acts, and the peculiar " stickiness " of bad reputations (e.g., Baumeister et al. 2001; Goffman 1963), psychological traits that facilitated the inhibition of selfish acts were likely subjected to natural selection.”
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028 · cited 1×
“…overlooks research in contemporary analytic philosophy about two relevant themes: (1) the problem of reference (Campbell 2002; Evans 1982; Kripke 1980; Perry 2001; Quine 1960; Strawson 1959) and (2) the problem of personal identity (Locke 1689/1975; Merricks 2001; Olson 1997; Parfit…”
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Cited by
Who Sees Human?: The Stability and Importance of Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism
Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J., & Epley, N. (2010) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691610369336 · Cited by 1,228
“Recent years, however, have seen a rapidly increasing interest in understanding people’s propensity to turn nonhuman agents into human ones (Bering, 2006; Epley et al., 2007; Kwan & Fiske, 2008).”
BackgroundGod Is Watching You: Priming God Concepts Increases Prosocial Behavior in an Anonymous Economic Game
Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01983.x · Cited by 1,136
Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387 · Cited by 1,008
“After all, people are intuitive dualists, perceiving minds and bodies as distinct (Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2004; Demertzi et al., 2009) and so stimuli or emotions that induce a bodily focus reduce ascriptions of mental states (Archer, Iritani, Kimes, & Barrios, 1983; Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009; Nussbaum, 1995).”
BackgroundThe cultural evolution of prosocial religions
Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14001356 · Cited by 934
The origin and evolution of religious prosociality
Norenzayan, A., & Shariff, A. F. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1158757 · Cited by 874
Metadata
- Authors
- Bering, J. M.
- Affiliations
- Queen's University Belfast (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bering, Jesse M.
- ORCID
- Bering, Jesse M.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 453-462
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2117463924
- Cited by
- 458
- References
- 279
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 31
- FWCI
- 28.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Research Portal (Queen's University Belfast) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion
- Social Sciences › Health › Religion, Spirituality, and Psychology
- Keywords
- afterlife beliefs, supernatural beliefs, existential psychology, folk psychology, natural selection, causal attribution, moral judgment, theory of mind, concept learning, teleological reasoning, dualism, religious indoctrination
- MeSH terms
- Attitude to Death, Culture, Biological Evolution, Existentialism, Humans, Parapsychology, Psychological Theory, Religion and Psychology, Intention
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.