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The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory

Metzinger, Thomas, Gallese, Vittorio · 2003 · Consciousness and Cognition

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its "phenomenal output")? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of…

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00072-2

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Kohler, 2001, Auditory mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex of the monkey, Social Neuroscience Abstract, XXVII, 9

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Metzinger, T., & Gallese, V.
Affiliations
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
Corresponding author
Metzinger, Thomas
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003-12
Volume
12
Issue
4
Pages
549-571
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2129723408
Cited by
132
References
62
Citations by year
2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 7
FWCI
3.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
Keywords
motor system, action goals, intentionality, multimodal representation, subjective experience, first-person perspective, social cognition, phenomenal consciousness, representationalism
MeSH terms
Animals, Haplorhini, Auditory Perception, Awareness, Brain, Brain Mapping, Consciousness, Ego, Humans, Internal-External Control, Interpersonal Relations, Neural Analyzers, Neurons, Problem Solving, Psychomotor Performance, Species Specificity, Visual Perception, Self Psychology, Intention

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00072-2
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Metzinger, T., & Gallese, V. (2003). The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory. Consciousness and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00072-2

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.