The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its "phenomenal output")? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of…
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Such mutually coupled selfmodels, in turn, are the fundamental representational resource for taking another person's perspective, for empathy and the sense of responsibility, but also for metacognitive achievements like the development of a concept of self and a theory of mind”
From Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples (2007) · cites this paper as Metzinger and Gallese, 2003
In the citing paper
“Human beings constantly augment themselves not only with sticks, stones, rakes, or robot armsbut also with the brains and bodies of other human beings (Metzinger and Gallese, 2003).”
From Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples (2007) · cites this paper as Metzinger and Gallese, 2003
In the citing paper
“a phenomenal self as subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation [6,7,9,21,22]”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [9]
Citations
Cites
The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6553 · Cited by 5,998
Action recognition in the premotor cortex
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/119.2.593 · Cited by 4,968
Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L. (1996) · Cognitive Brain Research · doi:10.1016/0926-6410(95)00038-0 · Cited by 4,870
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0626 · Cited by 4,674
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
(1988) · Cited by 3,656
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness
Panksepp, J., & Modell, A. H. (2000) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2000.10773287 · Cited by 3,393
Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35090060 · Cited by 3,302
Self-citationImitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates
Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1977) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.198.4312.75 · Cited by 3,263
Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading
Gallese, V (1998) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(98)01262-5 · Cited by 3,201
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Kohler, 2001, Auditory mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex of the monkey, Social Neuroscience Abstract, XXVII, 9
Cited by
Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & Panksepp, J. (2006) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002 · Cited by 2,792
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060
Self-citationEmbodied simulation: from neurons to phenomenal experience
Gallese, V. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-4737-z · Cited by 947
Self-citationHow is our self related to midline regions and the default-mode network?
Qin, P., & Northoff, G. (2011) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.028 · Cited by 909
Intentional attunement: Mirror neurons and the neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations
Gallese, V., Eagle, M. N., & Migone, P. (2007) · Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association · doi:10.1177/00030651070550010601 · Cited by 496
Metadata
- Authors
- Metzinger, T., & Gallese, V.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Metzinger, Thomas
- ORCID
- Metzinger, Thomas
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 549-571
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2129723408
- Semantic Scholar
- 0b3f2c5b146ae1c295deda6d339b39246531b719
- Cited by
- 132
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 3.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Keywords
- motor system, action goals, intentionality, multimodal representation, subjective experience, first-person perspective, social cognition, phenomenal consciousness, representationalism
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Haplorhini, Auditory Perception, Awareness, Brain, Brain Mapping, Consciousness, Ego, Humans, Internal-External Control, Interpersonal Relations, Neural Analyzers, Neurons, Problem Solving, Psychomotor Performance, Species Specificity, Visual Perception, Self Psychology, Intention
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00072-2
- The paper
- Metzinger, T., & Gallese, V. (2003). The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory. Consciousness and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00072-2
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.