Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples

May combine two claims.

Subject AZ experienced mental images of forearms (including fingers) and legs (with feet and first and fifth toes) but these were not as realistic as the content of her non-hallucinatory PSM.

“For as long as she remembers, she has experienced mental images of forearms (including fingers) and legs (with feet and first and fifth toes) -but, as the figure below shows, these were not as realistic as the content of her non-hallucinatory PSM.”

• cites Brugger et al., 2000 sourcePartly supported

  The passage labeled Abstract (page unavailable) says that A.Z. had experienced mental images of forearms, hands and fingers, and legs, feet and first and fifth toes for as long as she could remember. It reports vividness ratings for her phantom sensations, but does not say that the mental images were less realistic than her non-hallucinatory phantom sensations. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging of phantom hand movements showed no activation of the primary sensorimotor areas, but of the premotor and parietal cortex bilaterally.

“Functional magnetic resonance imaging of phantom hand movements showed no activation of the primary sensorimotor areas, but of the premotor and parietal cortex bilaterally.”

• cites Brugger et al., 2000 sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Brugger and colleagues introduced a vividness rating on a 7-point scale that showed highly consistent judgments across sessions for their subject AZ, a 44-year-old university-educated woman born without forearms and legs.

“A recent case study by Brugger and colleagues introduced a vividness rating on a 7-point scale that showed highly consistent judgments across sessions for their subject AZ, a 44-year-old university-educated woman born without forearms and legs.”

• cites Brugger et al., 2000 sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Unlike the phantom-limb patients in examples 1 and 2, and like most ordinary patients, the robot is able to restructure its body-representation following the loss of a limb and can learn.

“unlike the phantom-limb patients presented in example no. 1 and no. 2 (and like most ordinary patients), it is able to restructure its body-representation following the loss of a limb.It can learn.”

May combine two claims.

Starfish not only synthesizes an internal self-model, but also uses this self-model to generate intelligent behavior.

“Starfish not only synthesizes an internal selfmodel, but also uses this self-model to generate intelligent behavior.”

May combine two claims.

The Starfish robot, after part of its leg is removed, adapts its self-model and generates alternative gaits, learning to limp.

“part of its leg is removed, it adapts its self-model and generates alternative gaits -it learns to limp.”

May combine two claims.

This impression was less likely to occur in the 'object condition' and in all of the asynchronous conditions.

“This impression was less likely to occur in the ''object condition'' and in all of the asynchronous conditions.”

May combine two claims.

The present illusion did not induce full-blown out-of-body experiences; it was only a first step.

“Does illusory self-localization to a position outside one's body mean that we have experimentally induced full-blown out-of-body experiences?No, this was only a first step.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

What exists is the experience of being a self, as well as the diverse and constantly changing contents of self-consciousness.

“What does exist is the experience of being a self, as well as the diverse and constantly changing contents of self-consciousness.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The self is not a substance in the technical philosophical sense of something that could maintain its existence on its own even if the body, the brain, or everything else disappeared.

“One of the ontological claims of this theory is that the self is not a substance in the technical philosophical sense of something that could maintain its existence on its own, even if the body, the brain, or everything else disappeared.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

As long as a phenomenal self exists, consciousness is centered and bound to a first-person perspective.

“As long as a phenomenal self exists, our consciousness is centered and bound to what philosophers call a ''firstperson perspective.''”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The PSM is exactly that part of the mental self-model that is currently embedded in a highest order integrated structure, the global model of the world.

“The PSM is exactly that part of the mental selfmodel that is currently embedded in a highest order integrated structure, the global model of the world (Yates, 1975;Baars, 1988; for a detailed analysis of the criteria for distinguishing different degrees of consciousness, see Metzinger, 2003a, Chapter 3).”

• cites Yates, 1975 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Baars, 1988Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Metzinger, 2003a, Chapter 3Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

There is not only a true representational and functional description of the human self-model, but also a true neurobiological description.

“This means that there is not only a true representational and functional description of the human self-model, but also a true neurobiological description -for instance in terms of being a widely distributed, complex activation pattern in the brain (Damasio, 1999).”

• cites Damasio, 1999Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The human self-model will be predominantly a neurocomputational theory.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

SMT is predominantly a representational theory of consciousness because it analyzes conscious states as representational states and conscious contents as representational contents.

“SMT is predominantly a representational theory of consciousness, because it analyzes conscious states as representational states and conscious contents as representational contents.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The self is not an individual entity or a mysterious thing in the metaphysical sense.

“It is not an individual entity or a mysterious thing in the metaphysical sense.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The phenomenal self endows phenomenal space with centeredness and perspectivalness.

“It endows our phenomenal space with two particularly fascinating structural features: centeredness and perspectivalness.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

What probably distinguishes human beings from most other animals is that we not only have a subjectively experienced inner perspective, but can also consciously conceptualize ourselves as beings that have such an inner perspective.

“In other words, what probably distinguishes human beings from most other animals is that we not only have a subjectively experienced inner perspective, but can also consciously conceptualize ourselves as beings that have such an inner perspective.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The self-model is an episodically active representational entity whose content is determined by the system's very own properties.

“In our case, the self-model is an episodically active representational entity whose content is determined by the system's very own properties.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Under SMT, the conscious experience of being a self is analyzed as the result of complex information-processing mechanisms and representational processes in the central nervous system.

“Under SMT, this conscious experience of being a self is analyzed as the result of complex information-processing mechanisms and representational processes in the central nervous system.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The properties in question for the emergence of a conscious self are representational and functional brain properties.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Whenever such a self-representation is needed to regulate the system's interactions with the environment, it is transiently activated.

“Whenever such a self-representation is needed to regulate the system's interactions with the environment, it is transiently activated -for instance in the morning, when we wake up.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

States inside the center of consciousness are experienced as my own because they are endowed with a sense of ownership prior to language or conceptual thought.

“States inside this center of consciousness are experienced as my own states, because they are endowed with a sense of ownership that is prior to language or conceptual thought.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

According to SMT, waking up in the morning is the biological organism activating its PSM, the conscious self-model.

“According to SMT, what happens when you wake up in the morning -when you first come to yourself -is that the biological organism, which you are, boots up its PSM: it activates the conscious self-model.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The system needs a coherent self-representation, a consistent internal model of itself as a whole, to possess the relevant target properties.

“This is our first, preliminary answer: the system needs a coherent self-representation, a consistent internal model of itself as a whole.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

This is the decisive first step towards becoming an autonomous agent.

“This is the decisive first step towards becoming an autonomous agent.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The emergence of the bodily self-model is based on a subpersonal, automatic process of binding features together, of achieving coherence.

“The emergence of the bodily self-model is based on a subpersonal, automatic process of binding features together, of achieving coherence.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

You need a conscious self-model in order to achieve sensorimotor integration, generate complex, flexible and adaptive behavior, and attend to and control your body as a whole.

“It does so because you now need a conscious self-model in order to achieve sensorimotor integration, generate complex, flexible and adaptive behavior, and attend to and control your body as a whole.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The self-model is a transient computational module that is episodically activated by the system in order to control its interactions with the environment.

“the self-model is a transient computational module that is episodically activated by the system in order to control its interactions with the environment.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

A self-model supports planning and fast learning processes in a number of different ways.

“Third, a self-model supports planning and fast learning processes in a number of different ways.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

If this global representational property is lost, this changes the phenomenology and leads to the emergence of different neuropsychological deficits or altered states of consciousness.

“If this global representational property is lost, this also changes the phenomenology and leads to the emergence of different neuropsychological deficits or altered states of consciousness.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

A self-model clearly makes a system more intelligent.

“It clearly makes a system more intelligent.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

A self-model allows a physical system to 'enslave' its low-level dynamics with the help of a single, integrated, and internal whole-system model, thereby controlling and functionally 'owning' it.

“a selfmodel allows a physical system to ''enslave'' its low-level dynamics with the help of a single, integrated, and internal whole-system model, thereby controlling and functionally ''owning'' it.”

May combine two claims.

Their four-legged machine uses actuation-sensation relationships to indirectly infer its own structure and then uses this self-model to generate forward locomotion.

“Their four-legged machine uses actuation-sensation relationships to indirectly infer its own structure and then uses this self-model to generate forward locomotion.”

• cites Bongard et al. (2006) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Certain parts of the self-model can be unconscious and functionally active at the same time.

“In other words, certain parts of the self-model can be unconscious and functionally active at the same time.”

May combine two claims.

When part of its leg is removed, the machine adapts its self-model and generates alternative gaits - it learns to limp.

“When part of its leg is removed, it adapts its self-model and generates alternative gaits -it learns to limp.”

• cites Bongard et al. (2006) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In other cases, the subjective experience of being able to move and control the phantom limb is lost.

“In other cases, the subjective experience of being able to move and control the phantom limb is lost.”

May combine two claims.

A self-model can be entirely unconscious; it can frequently be seen as the product of an automatic bottom-up process of dynamical self-organization.

“First, a self-model can be entirely unconscious; i.e., it can frequently be seen as the product of an automatic ''bottom-up'' process of dynamical self-organization”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

A body-model has the function of integrating sensory impressions with motor output in a more intelligent and flexible manner.

“More precisely, a body-model has the function of integrating sensory impressions with motor output in a more intelligent and flexible manner.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

An active self-model can be seen as a subpersonal functional state: a set of causal relations of varying complexity that may or may not be realized at a given point in time.

“An active self-model then can be seen as a subpersonal functional state: a set of causal relations of varying complexity that may or may not be realized at a given point in time.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

These alternative configurations may result from preamputational paralysis following peripheral nerve damage or from prolonged loss of proprioceptive and kinesthetic feedback that could confirm the occurrence of movement.

“These alternative configurations may result from preamputational paralysis following peripheral nerve damage or from prolonged loss of proprioceptive and kinesthetic ''feedback'' that could confirm the occurrence of movement.”

May combine two claims.

Mutually coupled self-models are the fundamental representational resource for taking another person's perspective, for empathy and the sense of responsibility, and for metacognitive achievements like the development of a concept of self and a theory of mind.

“Such mutually coupled selfmodels, in turn, are the fundamental representational resource for taking another person's perspective, for empathy and the sense of responsibility, but also for metacognitive achievements like the development of a concept of self and a theory of mind”

• cites Bischof-Ko¨hler, 1996, 1989Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Gallese and Goldman, 1998Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Metzinger and Gallese, 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The subjectively experienced content of the phenomenal self is the representational content of a currently active, dynamic data structure in the system's central nervous system.

“the subjectively experienced content of the phenomenal self is the representational content of a currently active, dynamic data structure in the system's central nervous system.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

When Philip closed his eyes, the phantom limb froze again; he felt his right hand moving but no movement in the phantom.

“''Oh, my,'' he said, clearly disappointed.''It's frozen again.I feel my right hand moving, but there's no movement in the phantom.''”

• cites Ramachandran 1998, 47f.Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

The experimental findings illustrate the concept of a self-model; what is moving in this experiment is the PSM.

“By now, it should be clear how these experimental findings illustrate the concept of a ''selfmodel'' that I introduced above; what is moving in this experiment is the PSM.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The unconscious precursor of the PSM clearly was a new form of intelligence.

“The unconscious precursor of the PSM clearly was a new form of intelligence.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The moment of waking up is exactly the moment in which this new instrument of intelligent information-processing emerges in your brain.

“the moment of ''waking up'' is exactly the moment in which this new instrument of intelligent informationprocessing emerges in your brain.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

A self-model is a virtual model or 'virtual organ', and one of its major functions consists in appropriating a body by using a global morphological model to control it as a whole.

“Fourth, it is what I called a virtual model or ''virtual organ'' above, and one of its major functions consists in appropriating a body by using a global morphological model to control it as a whole.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The transition from stump to phantom limb is seamless; subjectively, they are both part of one and the same bodily self, because the quality of ownership is distributed evenly among them.

“The transition from stump to phantom limb is seamless; subjectively, they are both part of one and the same bodily self, because the quality of ownership is distributed evenly among them.”

May combine two claims.

You do not have to be a living being in order to have a self-model; non-biological SMT-systems are possible.

“First, you do not have to be a living being in order to have a self-model.Non-biological SMT-systems are possible.”

May combine two claims.

Plastic and ever more complex self-models allowed somatosensory, perceptual, and cognitive functions to be continuously optimized, and made the development of social cognition and cooperative behavior possible.

“Plastic and ever more complex self-models not only allowed somatosensory, perceptual, and cognitive functions to be continuously optimized, but also made the development of social cognition and cooperative behavior possible.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Devinsky et al. differentiated between autoscopy in the form of a complex hallucinatory perception of one's own body as being external with the subject's consciousness usually perceived within his body and a second type, the classic OBE, which includes the feeling of leaving one's body and viewing it from another vantagepoint.

“Devinsky et al. (1989Devinsky et al. ( , p. 1080) ) have differentiated between autoscopy in the form of a complex hallucinatory perception of one's own body as being external with ''the subject's consciousness y usually perceived within his body'' and a second type, the classic OBE, which includes the feeling of leaving one's body and viewing it from another vantagepoint.”

• cites Devinsky et al., 1989 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The OBE clearly is something like a phenomenological prototype; there is a common core to the phenomenon.

“On the other hand, the OBE clearly is something like a phenomenological prototype.There is a common core to the phenomenon, as can be seen from the simple fact that many readers will already have heard about this type of experience in one way or another.”

May combine two claims.

The prevalence of OBEs ranges from 10% in the general population to 25% in students, with 42% in schizophrenics.

“The prevalence of OBEs ranges from 10% in the general population to 25% in students, with extremely high incidences in certain subpopulations like, to name just one example, 42% in schizophrenics (Blackmore, 1986; see also Blackmore, 1982; for an overview and further references see Alvarado, 1986Alvarado, , 2000, p. 18;, p. 18;Irwin, 1985, p. 174).”

• cites Blackmore, 1986Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Blackmore, 1982Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Alvarado, 1986Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

OBEs frequently occur during extreme sports, for instance, in high-altitude climbers or marathon runners.

“They frequently occur during extreme sports, for instance, in high-altitude climbers or marathon runners.”

May combine two claims.

The sense of ownership is not necessarily connected to these mental representations; it is not an intrinsic, but a relational property.

“This property, the sense of ownership, is not necessarily connected to these mental representations; i.e., it is not an intrinsic, but a relational property.”

May combine two claims.

The incidence of autoscopic seizures is possibly higher than previously recognized; Devinsky et al. found a 6.3% incidence in their patient population.

“The incidence of autoscopic seizures is possibly higher than previously recognized, and the authors found a 6.3% incidence in their patient population (Devinsky et al., 1989(Devinsky et al., , p. 1085)).”

• cites Devinsky et al., 1989 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Phenomenal selfhood corresponds to the existence of a single, coherent, and temporally stable self-model that constitutes the center of the representational state as whole.

“Phenomenal selfhood corresponds to the existence of a single, coherent, and temporally stable self-model that constitutes the center of the representational state as whole.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

This may allow for a high degree of integrated processing, i.e., of 'mental clarity,' by functionally encapsulating and thereby modularizing different functions like proprioception, attention, and cognition in order to preserve at least some of these functions in a life-threatening situation.

“This may allow for a high degree of integrated processing, i.e., of ''mental clarity,'' by functionally encapsulating and thereby modularizing different functions like proprioception, attention, and cognition in order to preserve at least some of these functions in a life-threatening situation.”

May combine two claims.

In the RHI, the feeling of ownership or phenomenal mineness is transferred to the rubber hand; the subject experiences the rubber hand as her own hand and feels the strokes in this hand.

“At the same time, the feeling of ''ownership'' or phenomenal ''mineness'' is transferred to the rubber hand.The subject experiences the rubber hand as her own hand and feels the strokes in this hand.”

• cites Botvinick and Cohen, 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

There is a well-known class of phenomenal states in which the experiencing person undergoes the conscious experience of leaving his or her physical body, usually in the form of an etheric double, and moving around outside of it.

“There is a well-known class of phenomenal states in which the experiencing person undergoes the untranscendable and highly realistic conscious experience of leaving his or her physical body, usually in the form of an etheric double, and moving around outside of it.”

May combine two claims.

This structural feature of the global representational space leads to the episodic instantiation of a temporally extended and non-conceptual first-person perspective, which can be lost.

“This structural feature of the global representational space leads to the episodic instantiation of a temporally extended and non-conceptual first-person perspective.It, too, can be lost.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

OBEs frequently occur spontaneously while falling asleep, but also following severe accidents or during surgical operations.

“OBEs frequently occur spontaneously while falling asleep, but also following severe accidents or during surgical operations.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The OBE may be an instance of transient functional modularization, of a 'purposeful,' i.e., functionally adequate, separation of levels of representational content in the PSM.

“The OBE may be an instance of transient functional modularization, of a ''purposeful,'' i.e., functionally adequate, separation of levels of representational content in the PSM.”

May combine two claims.

It would be false to assume that OBEs typically occur in people suffering from severe psychiatric disorders or neurological deficits; most OBE-reports come from ordinary people in everyday life situations.

“However, it would be false to assume that OBEs typically occur in people suffering from severe psychiatric disorders or neurological deficits.Quite the contrary, most OBE-reports come from ordinary people in everyday life situations.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The concept of an OBE may turn out to be a cluster concept constituted by a whole range of diverging (and possibly overlapping) subsets of phenomenological constraints, each forming a set of sufficient, but not necessary, conditions.

“Instead, the concept of an OBE may turn out to be a cluster concept constituted by a whole range of diverging (and possibly overlapping) subsets of phenomenological constraints, each forming a set of sufficient, but not necessary, conditions.”

May combine two claims.

In the RHI, while only 2 out of 120 subjects reported an actual pain sensation, many subjects drew back their real hands, opened their eyes widely in surprise, or laughed nervously.

“While only 2 out of 120 subjects reported an actual pain sensation, many subjects drew back their real hands, opened their eyes up widely in surprise, or laughed nervously (Armel andRamachandran, 2003, p. 1503).”

• cites Armel and Ramachandran, 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The quote only partly states this claim.

If the system is no longer able to integrate certain discrete representational contents into its self-model, mineness is lost.

“If the system is no longer able to integrate certain discrete representational contents into its self-model, it is lost.”

May combine two claims.

Mineness can disappear in other phenomenological contexts, and its distribution over the different elements of a conscious world-model can vary.

“It could have been otherwise, in other phenomenological contexts, mineness disappears.Its distribution over the different elements of a conscious world-model can vary.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Almost all necessary system-related information is still globally available, and higher order processes like attention and cognition can still operate on this information as it continues to be presented in an integrated manner, but its distribution across specific subregions of phenomenal space as a whole changes dramatically.

“Almost all necessary system-related information is still globally available, and higher order processes like attention and cognition can still operate on this information as it continues to be presented in an integrated manner, but its distribution across specific subregions of phenomenal space as a whole changes dramatically.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

If this analysis is correct, it should be possible, at least in principle, to operationalize phenomenal mineness by searching for an empirically testable metrics for the coherence of the self-model in the respective areas of interest.

“If this analysis is correct, it should be possible, at least in principle, to operationalize this property by searching for an empirically testable metrics for the coherence of the self-model in the respective areas of interest.”

May combine two claims.

Only one of the two self-models is truly 'situated' in the overall scene; only one of them is immediately embodied and virtually self-present in the sense of being integrated into an internally simulated behavioral space.

“Only one of the two self-models is truly ''situated'' in the overall scene; only one of them is immediately embodied and virtually self-present in the sense of being integrated into an internally simulated behavioral space.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

It has long been known that OBEs not only occur in healthy subjects, but in certain clinical populations (e.g., epileptics) as well.

“It has long been known that OBEs not only occur in healthy subjects, but in certain clinical populations (e.g., epileptics) as well.”

May combine two claims.

The second body-model is the locus of the phenomenal self; it forms the 'true' focus of one's phenomenal experience and functions as an integrated representation of all kinesthetic qualia and all non-visual forms of proprioception.

“This second body-model is the locus of the phenomenal self.It not only forms the ''true'' focus of one's phenomenal experience, but also functions as an integrated representation of all kinesthetic qualia and all non-visual forms of proprioception.”

May combine two claims.

The classic OBE contains two self-models, one visually represented from an external perspective and one forming the center of the phenomenal world from which the first-person perspective originates.

“The classic OBE contains two self-models, one visually represented from an external perspective and one forming the center of the phenomenal world from which the first-person perspective originates.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Phenomenal representations appear to be exactly that set of representations for which we cannot distinguish between representational content and representational carrier on the level of subjective experience.

“Phenomenal representations appear to be exactly that set of representations for which we cannot distinguish between representational content and representational carrier on the level of subjective experience.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The PMIR is another naturally evolved virtual organ, just like the PSM.

“The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation (PMIR), is just another naturally evolved virtual organ, just like the PSM.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The self-model is the only representational structure anchored in a continuous source of internally generated input in the brain (the persistent causal link hypothesis).

“The selfmodel is the only representational structure that is anchored in a continuous source of internally generated input in the brain.Let us call this the ''persistent causal link hypothesis.''”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

May combine two claims.

Recent neuroscientific data support the view that any successful extension of behavioral space is mirrored in the neural substrate of the body image in the brain; the brain constructs an internalized image of the tool by assimilating it into the existing body image.

“In other words, recent neuroscientific data clearly support the view that tools not only enable us to extend our reaching space.They show that any successful extension of behavioral space is also mirrored in the neural substrate of the body image in the brain.The brain constructs an ''internalized'' image of the tool by swiftly assimilating it into the existing body image as a whole.”

• cites Maravita and Iriki, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The intentionality relation is primarily an epistemic relation between subject and object; a mental state becomes a carrier of knowledge in virtue of being directed at something other than itself.

“The intentionality relation is primarily an epistemic relation between subject and object.A mental state becomes a carrier of knowledge in virtue of being directed at something other than itself -like an arrow pointing from a person's mind to an object in the real or even just in a possible world.”

May combine two claims.

Cognitive availability alone is not sufficient to dissolve the naïve realism of phenomenal experience; the transparency of phenomenal representations is cognitively impenetrable.

“The interesting point, however, is that cognitive availability alone is not sufficient to dissolve the naı¨ve realism of phenomenal experience.You cannot simply ''think'' yourself out of your phenomenal model of reality by changing your opinions about this model: the transparency of phenomenal representations is cognitively impenetrable; here, phenomenal knowledge is not the same as conceptual/pro”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Phenomenal transparency in general means that the representational character of the contents of conscious experience itself is not accessible to subjective experience.

“Phenomenal transparency in general, however, means that the representational character of the contents of conscious experience itself is not accessible to subjective experience.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Phenomenologically, a transparent world-model gives rise to a reality; a transparent system-model gives rise to a self embedded in this reality; if there is also a transparent model of transient relations between self and objects, this results in a phenomenal first-person perspective.

“Phenomenologically, a transparent world-model gives rise to a reality.A transparent system-model gives rise to a self that is embedded in this reality.If there is also a transparent model of the transient and constantly changing relations between the perceiving and acting self and the objects and persons in this reality, this results in what I called a ''phenomenal first-person perspective'' above”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

There is not only a neurobiologically anchored core self, a self-presentation, but also a dynamic phenomenal simulation of the self as subject embedded in the world via constantly changing epistemic relations and agentive interactions.

“Now, there is not only a neurobiologically anchored core self, a self-presentation, but also a dynamic phenomenal simulation of the self as subject embedded in the world via constantly changing epistemic relations and agentive interactions.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

An additional necessary condition involved in generating full-blown out-of-body experiences and the complete transfer of selfhood to the illusory body is a transient episode of visual-vestibular disintegration.

“I believe that an additional necessary condition involved in generating full-blown out-of-body experiences and the complete transfer of selfhood to the illusory body is a transient episode of visual-vestibular disintegration.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

A genuine inner perspective arises if and only if the system represents itself as currently interacting with the world to itself, and if it does not recognize this representation as a representation.

“A genuine inner perspective arises if only and only if the system represents itself as currently interacting with the world to itself, and if it does not recognize this representation as a representation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

In a much larger explanatory time-window, there apparently was no evolutionary pressure on the respective parts of our functional architecture in the process of natural selection.

“Second, in a much larger explanatory time-window, there apparently was no evolutionary pressure on the respective parts of our functional architecture in the process of natural selection.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Naïve realism is not a belief or an intellectual attitude, but a feature of phenomenal experience itself.

“Naı¨ve realism is not a belief or an intellectual attitude, but a feature of phenomenal experience itself.”

May combine two claims.

When a food pellet is dispensed beyond reach and macaques use a rake to pull it closer, one can observe a change in their bodily self-model in the brain; it looks as if their conscious model of their hand had been expanded towards the tip of the tool.

“When a food pellet is dispensed beyond the reach of their hands and they skillfully use a rake to pull it closer, one can observe a change in their bodily self-model in the brain.In fact, it looks as if their conscious model of their hand had been expanded towards the tip of the tool.”

• cites Maravita and Iriki, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Monkeys have the conscious experience of ownership rather than only the unconscious mechanism.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

In standard situations, the consciously experienced first-person perspective is the content of a transparent PMIR.

“In standard situations, the consciously experienced first-person perspective is the content of a transparent PMIR.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Many phenomenal representations are transparent because their content and its very existence appear to be fixed in all possible contexts.

“Many phenomenal representations are transparent because their content and its very existence appear to be fixed in all possible contexts.”

May combine two claims.

In standard phenomenological configurations, the entity that looks at the book in its hands is itself a form of transparent phenomenal content, and this is also true of the 'at'-ness inherent in visual attention.

“In standard phenomenological configurations, however, the entity that looks at the book in its hands is itself a form of transparent phenomenal content.And this is also true of the ''at''-ness inherent in this act of visual attention, of the relation that seems to connect subject and object.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The virtual self-moving through the phenomenal world does not have a brain, motor system, or sensory organs; certain parts of the environment appear directly in its mind, and the perceptual process is experienced as effortless and immediate.

“The virtual self-moving through the phenomenal world does not have a brain, a motor system, or sensory organs: certain parts of the environment appear directly in its mind; the perceptual process is experienced as effortless and immediate.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

In a very small time-window, neural data structures in question are activated so quickly and reliably that the system is no longer able to recognize them as such, due to the comparatively slow temporal resolution of metarepresentational functions.

“First, in a very small time-window, the neural data structures in question are activated so quickly and reliably that the system is no longer able to recognize them as such, for instance due to the comparatively slow temporal resolution of metarepresentational functions.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The transition from biological to cultural evolution is intimately connected with the appearance of new and specific functional properties in the primate-PSM.

“Clearly, the transition form biological to cultural evolution is intimately connected with the appearance of new and specific functional properties in the primate-PSM.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Some elementary building block of human tool-use abilities already existed in the brains of our ancestors.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Opaque phenomenal representations arise when the information that their content is the result of an internal representational process suddenly becomes globally available.

“For instance, opaque phenomenal representations arise when the information that their content is the result of an internal representational process suddenly becomes globally available.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Whenever conscious experience arises, a continuous source of internal proprioceptive input also exists.

“Whenever conscious experience arises (i.e., whenever a stable, integrated model of reality is activated), this continuous source of internal proprioceptive input also exists.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

For biological systems like us, naïve realism was a functionally adequate background assumption.

“For biological systems like us, naı¨ve realism was a functionally adequate background assumption.”

May combine two claims.

During successful tool-use, changes in specific neural networks in macaque brains take place, suggesting that tools are temporarily integrated into their body schema.

“During successful tool-use, changes in specific neural networks in their brains take place -a finding that suggests that the tools are temporarily integrated into their body schema.”

• cites Maravita and Iriki, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

A conscious human being is a system capable of dynamically co-representing the representational relation while representational acts are taking place, using the PMIR as instrument.

“But the core idea is as follows: a conscious human being is a system that is capable of dynamically co-representing the representational relation while representational acts are taking place, and the instrument it uses for this purpose is the PMIR.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The conscious self-model is a virtual organ that allows us to own feedback loops, to initiate, sustain, and flexibly adapt control processes.

“The conscious self-model is a virtual organ that allows us to own feedback loops, to initiate, sustain, and flexibly adapt control processes.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The principle that at least two spatial frames of reference must be functionally dissociated should hold for the experimental setup as well as for OBEs in epileptic patients or gifted subjects in the healthy population.

“This general principle should hold for our experimental setup as well as for OBEs in epileptic patients or ''gifted subjects'' in the healthy population.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The PSM is the interface that the system uses to functionally appropriate its own hardware, to control its own low-level dynamics and to become autonomous.

“The PSM is the interface that the system uses to functionally appropriate its own hardware, to control its own low-level dynamics and to become autonomous.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). The quote only partly states this claim.

There are four types of internally generated information that during conscious episodes constitute a persistent functional link between the PSM and its bodily basis in the brain: vestibular inputs, body schema inputs, visceral inputs, and upper brain stem/hypothalamus inputs.

“Basically, there are four different types of internally generated information that during conscious episodes, constitute a persistent functional link between the PSM and its bodily basis in the brain”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The self-model is the functional window through which the brain can interact with the body as a whole, and vice versa.

“The self-model is the functional window through which the brain can interact with the body as a whole, and vice versa.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

A self-presentation is exactly that part of the phantom limb that remains conscious independently of the occurrence of movement; if this part is lost, one loses the subjective experience of bodily presence and turns into a disembodied being.

“A self-presentation is exactly that part of the phantom limb that remains conscious independently of the occurrence of movement.If this part is lost, you also lose the subjective experience of bodily presence -you turn into a ''disembodied being.''”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

There appears to be no necessary connection between the fundamental functional and representational properties and the phenomenal target properties of mineness, prereflexive/preagentive selfhood, and perspectivalness.

“Second, at least according to certain modal intuitions, there appears to be no necessary connection between the fundamental functional and representational properties on the one hand and the phenomenal target properties of ''mineness,'' ''prereflexive/ preagentive selfhood,'' and ''perspectivalness'' on the other hand.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Out-of-body experiences are characterized by disembodiment of the self to an extracorporeal location, an extracorporeal visuo-spatial perspective, and seeing of one's own body from this extracorporeal self-location.

“Out-of-body experiences are characterized by disembodiment of the self to an extracorporeal location, an extracorporeal visuo-spatial perspective, and seeing of one's own body from this extracorporeal self-location.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The weaker degree of phenomenological vividness or realness in patient AZ's phantom limbs may reflect the absence of permanent bottom-up stimulation that in normal situations is caused by existing physical limbs.

“The weaker degree of phenomenological ''vividness'' or ''realness'' in her phantom limbs may reflect exactly the absence of permanent bottom-up stimulation that in normal situations is caused by existing physical limbs.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).

The constant self-organizing activity of those regions of the bodily self that are independent of external input constitutes the functional center of phenomenal representational space.

“My hypothesis is that the constant self-organizing activity of those regions of the bodily self that are independent of external input constitutes the functional center of phenomenal representational space.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The phenomenal self is the part of the brain's user interface that the system uses to experience itself as a whole, to represent itself as a thinking self and an agent.

“The phenomenal self is the part of this interface that the system uses to experience itself as a whole, to represent itself as a thinking self and an agent.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The experience of selfhood is intimately related not only to the sense of ownership, but also to the experience of agency; it involves directedness and being dynamically related to target objects and goal states.

“The experience of selfhood is intimately related not only to the sense of ownership, but also to the experience of agency; it is not only a question of having a transparent self-model, but also of directedness, of being dynamically related to target objects and goal states.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The human PSM is anchored in the brain through a continuous flow of self-generated input, providing a persistent causal link into the physical body.

“In standard situations, and as opposed to all other conscious model of aspects of reality, the human PSM is anchored in the brain through a continuous flow of self-generated input.There exists a persistent causal link into the physical body itself.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The way we subjectively experience the subject-object relation is a simplified version of the actual processes; it is a functionally adequate confabulation.

“Of course, the way we subjectively experience this subject-object relation is a simplified version of the actual processes -in a sense, it is a functionally adequate confabulation.”

May combine two claims.

The representational carrier of conscious experience is a particular brain process that is not consciously experienced; it is transparent in the sense that one looks right through it.

“The representational carrier of your conscious experience is a particular brain process.This process -that itself is in no way ''book-like''is not consciously experienced; it is transparent in the sense that phenomenologically, you look right through it.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

By logical necessity, a phenomenally transparent self-model will create the experience of being infinitely close to yourself.

“By logical necessity, a phenomenally transparent selfmodel will create the experience of being infinitely close to yourself.”

May combine two claims.

The classical RHI only tells us something about the target property of 'ownership' (for body parts), but not about 'selfhood' (ownership for the whole body).

“The classical RHI (example no.4) only tells us something about the target property of ''ownership'' (for body parts), but not about ''selfhood'' (ownership for the whole body).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

If many intentional arrows are consciously available, represented by the brain on the functional level of global availability, this results in a temporally extended first-person perspective.

“If many of these arrows are consciously available, represented by the brain on the functional level of global availability, this results in a temporally extended first-person perspective.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Phenomenal transparency is exclusively a property of conscious states; unconscious states are neither transparent nor opaque.

“Transparency, as defined in this context, is exclusively a property of conscious states.Unconscious states are neither transparent nor opaque.”

May combine two claims.

The contents of phenomenal experience not only create a world; they also create a present.

“The contents of phenomenal experience not only create a world; they also create a present (see Metzinger, 2003a, Section 3.2.2).”

• cites Metzinger, 2003aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

At least two spatial frames of reference must be functionally dissociated for a teleportation-OBE with realistic exit phenomenology and a gradual motion path through phenomenal space.

“At least two spatial frames of reference must be functionally dissociated, in order to not only have a ''teleportation-OBE,'' but a realistic exit phenomenology, a gradual motion path through phenomenal space.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

A necessary precondition of expanding one's space of action and capabilities by using tools is the ability to integrate them into a preexisting self-model.

“A necessary precondition of expanding your space of action and your capabilities by using tools clearly seems to be the ability to integrate them into a preexisting self-model.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The human self-model possesses an enduring causal link in the brain, realized by permanent forms of information processing on permanent forms of self-generated input and low-level autoregulation.

“The human self-model possesses an enduring causal link in the brain.It has parts, which in turn are realized by permanent forms of information processing on permanent forms of self-generated input and low-level autoregulation.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

May combine two claims.

The core of the self-model theory is that this is how the basic sense of selfhood arises and how a phenomenal self that is untranscendable for the respective system comes about.

“The core of the self-model theory is that this is how the basic sense of selfhood arises and how a phenomenal self that is untranscendable for the respective system comes about.”

May combine two claims.

Truth and falsity, reality and illusion do not exist for biological information-processing systems at the developmental stage in question.

“Truth and falsity, reality and illusion do not exist for biological information-processing systems at the developmental stage in question.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Speaking of illusions presupposes someone having them.

“Speaking of illusions presupposes someone having them.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Subjectivity in an epistemic sense, an epistemic first-person perspective, is yet another step.

“Subjectivity in an epistemic sense, an epistemic firstperson perspective is yet another step.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Experiencing means repeatedly and continuously binding discrete events that have already been represented as such into temporal gestalts, into a consciously experienced moment.

“It means repeatedly and continuously binding discrete events that have already been represented as such into temporal gestalts, into a consciously experienced moment.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The PSM is an important part of a control hierarchy.

“Very obviously, the PSM is an important part of a control hierarchy; it is a means to monitor certain critical aspects of the”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Subjective, first-person knowledge is knowledge associated with a specific inner mode of presentation, namely as knowledge under a PMIR.

“the author of this chapter holds that subjective, first-person knowledge is precisely knowledge associated with a specific inner mode of presentation, namely as knowledge under a PMIR.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

The mechanisms creating temporal experience and our subjective sense of presence are transparent.

“experience and our subjective sense of presence are transparent as well.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The realism of phenomenal experience arises because it represents a possibility-the best hypothesis at a given moment-as an untranscendable reality, or an actuality.

“The realism of phenomenal experience arises because it represents a possibility -the best hypothesis there is at a given moment -as an untranscendable reality, or an actuality.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

AZ's self-representation is a form of misrepresentation because its referent never existed.

“as the referent of this representation never existed, this obviously is also a form of misrepresentation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

On the level of phenomenology, as well as on the level of neurobiology, the conscious self is neither a form of knowledge nor an illusion.

“On the level of phenomenology, as well as on the level of neurobiology, the conscious self is neither a form of knowledge nor an illusion.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Psychology is self-model research.

“Psychology is self-model research.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

In the ongoing process on the subpersonal level there is no agent that could count as the creator of an illusion.

“In this ongoing process on the subpersonal level there is no agent -no evil demon that could count as the creator of an illusion.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is a subpersonal level of self-organization in the brain.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The phenomenology of selfhood, of non-conceptual self-consciousness, is the most important precondition for epistemic first-person perspective, because it is the precondition for genuinely reflexive, conceptual self-consciousness.

“Of course, the phenomenology of selfhood, of non-conceptual self-consciousness, is the most important precondition for this step, because it is the precondition for genuinely reflexive, conceptual self-consciousness.”

May combine two claims.

On the level of body-representation, self-presentation is what AZ lacks in her phantom limbs, whereas self-representation is what she actually has.

“On the level of body-representation, selfpresentation is what AZ lacks in her phantom limbs, whereas self-representation is what she actually has”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

SMT is maximally parsimonious.

“It is also maximally parsimonious, as it allows us to account for the emergence of self-consciousness without assuming the existence of a substantial self.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Psychology is the scientific discipline that focuses on the representational content, the functional profile and the neurobiological realization of the human self-model, including its evolutionary history and its necessary social correlates.

“It is the scientific discipline that focuses on the representational content, the functional profile and the neurobiological realization of the human self-model, including its evolutionary history and its necessary social correlates.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

We only have a theory of the phenomenology of selfhood, not a theory of self-knowledge.

“So far, we only have a theory of the phenomenology of selfhood, not a theory of self-knowledge.”

May combine two claims.

After animals started to control the actuator directly using their neuronal activity, their limbs eventually stopped moving, while the animals continued to control the actuator by generating proper modulations of their cortical neurons.

“Remarkably, after these animals started to control the actuator directly using their neuronal activity, their limbs eventually stopped moving, while the animals continued to control the actuator by generating proper modulations of their cortical neurons.”

• cites Lebedev and Nicolelis, 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Phenomenal space is a virtual space: its content is a possible reality.

“And this finally helps understand what it means to say that phenomenal space is a virtual space: its content is a possible reality.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Something that is not an epistemic subject in a strong sense of conceptual/propositional knowledge is unable to confuse itself with anything else.

“But something that is not an epistemic subject in a strong sense of conceptual/propositional knowledge is simply unable to confuse itself with anything else.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Every single instance of the PSM/PMIR is identical with a specific time-slice in the continuous, dynamical self-organization of coherent activity taking place in an individual biological brain.

“Ultimately, and obviously, every single instance of the PSM/PMIR is identical with a specific time-slice in the continuous, dynamical self-organization of coherent activity taking place in an individual biological brain.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is a subpersonal level of self-organization in the brain.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Subjectivity in the epistemological sense can be naturalized only if we can tell a convincing evolutionary and neuroscientific story about how the PMIR could have developed in a self-organizing physical universe.

“Subjectivity in the epistemological sense can be naturalized as well -but only if we can tell a convincing evolutionary and neuroscientific story about how this representational architecture, this highly specific, indexical inner mode of presentation, could actually have developed in a selforganizing physical universe in the first place.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The brain is a self-organizing physical system.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The virtual character of both the self-model and the window of presence are not available on the level of subjective experience itself.

“the virtual character of both the self-model and the window of presence are not available on the level of subjective experience itself”

May combine two claims.

Once the monkey has successfully embedded an internal representation of a new actuator into his conscious self-model, the representations of his old body parts lose certain functional properties, become less available for attentional processing, and gradually recede from conscious experience.

“once the monkey has successfully embedded an internal representation of this new actuator into his conscious self-model, the representations of his old body parts lose certain functional properties, they transiently becomes less and less available for attentional processing and gradually recede from conscious experience.”