The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The disunity of consciousness.
Abstract
Attempts to decode what has become known as the (singular) neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) suppose that consciousness is a single unified entity, a belief that finds expression in the term 'unity of consciousness'. Here, I propose that the quest for the NCC will remain elusive until we acknowledge that consciousness is not a unity, and that there are instead many consciousnesses that are distributed in time and space.
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In the citing paper
“He proposes three hierarchical levels at which consciousness takes place in the brain: micro-consciousness corresponding to the different levels of the visual system that process distinct attributes (e.g., V4 processes color where as V5 processes motion), macro-consciousness that integrates multiple attributes of a system (e.g., binding color to motion), and unified consciousness corresponding to”
From The Easy Part of the Hard Problem: A Resonance Theory of Consciousness (2019) · cites this paper as Zeki, 2003
In the citing paper
“Zeki further suggests that each of these nested levels of consciousness occur in a distinct temporal order, with the lower order levels being ahead of and feeding into the higher order levels.”
From The Easy Part of the Hard Problem: A Resonance Theory of Consciousness (2019) · cites this paper as Zeki, 2003
In the citing paper
“Such a hierarchical view of consciousness represents the basis of Zeki and Bartel’s (Zeki and Bartels, 1999; Zeki, 2003) theory of how consciousness manifests in the brain.”
From The Easy Part of the Hard Problem: A Resonance Theory of Consciousness (2019) · cites this paper as Zeki, 2003
In the citing paper
“In other words, Zeki’s view suggests that the different conscious observers in the brain may experience the same events at slightly different times and at different durations, with the final unified consciousness entailing the longest moments/durations of experience.”
From The Easy Part of the Hard Problem: A Resonance Theory of Consciousness (2019) · cites this paper as Zeki, 2003
Citations
Cites
Neurophysiological investigation of the basis of the fMRI signal
Logothetis, N. K., Pauls, J., Augath, M., Trinath, T., & Oeltermann, A. (2001) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35084005 · Cited by 6,551 · cited 1×
“... are active, regardless of whether the subjects saw the stimulus (were conscious of it) or not (see Box 1). The difference between the two states is that, in the former, the activity is higher than in the latter, although we do not know yet whether this is owing to the recruitment of previously inactive cells, to a…”
BackgroundSegregation of Form, Color, Movement, and Depth: Anatomy, Physiology, and Perception
Livingstone, M., & Hubel, D. (1988) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.3283936 · Cited by 3,355
A direct demonstration of functional specialization in human visual cortex
Zeki, S., Watson, J., Lueck, C., Friston, K., Kennard, C., & Frackowiak, R. (1991) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.11-03-00641.1991 · Cited by 1,716 · cited 1×
“By general agreement, this functional specialization is especially true of the colour and the visual motion systems, which occupy geographically distinct locations in the visual cortex (Fig. 1). A pivotal area for the colour system is the V4 complex, and for the visual motion system the V5 complex [ 5 ,7].”
BackgroundSelf-citation(1990) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 1,661
Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition priming
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Cohen, L., Bihan, D. L., Mangin, J.-F., Poline, J.-B., & Rivière, D. (2001) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/89551 · Cited by 1,305 · cited 1×
“This has led us to propose that it is heightened activity within a specialized cortical area that leads to conscious vision and that its absence (or lower activity) in the same area correlates with a lack of conscious experience, a proposal that has been confirmed in other systems, not related to visual motion [27] or…”
Functional specialisation in the visual cortex of the rhesus monkey
Zeki, S. M. (1978) · Nature · doi:10.1038/274423a0 · Cited by 872
Self-citationNeural correlates of consciousness in humans
Rees, G., Kreiman, G., & Koch, C. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn783 · Cited by 742
A CENTURY OF CEREBRAL ACHROMATOPSIA
ZEKI, S. (1990) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/113.6.1721 · Cited by 457 · cited 1×
“Further support comes from the generally accepted clinical evidence that lesions of V4 and of V5 lead to different visual disabilities, the former resulting in an achromatopsia (acquired colour blindness) [8, 9 ] and the latter in an akinetopsia [10,11] (acquired visual motion blindness) (Fig. 1). Crucially, a lesion…”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Riddoch syndrome: insights into the neurobiology of conscious vision
Zeki, S. (1998) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/121.1.25 · Cited by 420 · cited 3×
“Moreover, the switch from a state when GY is not conscious of visual stimuli and cannot therefore discriminate them correctly to the state when he is conscious of them and can therefore discriminate them correctly is accompanied by a significant increase in activity in area V5, not elsewhere [ 17 ].”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDISTURBED PERCEPTION OF COLOURS ASSOCIATED WITH LOCALIZED CEREBRAL LESIONS
MEADOWS, J. C. (1974) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/97.1.615 · Cited by 402 · cited 1×
“Further support comes from the generally accepted clinical evidence that lesions of V4 and of V5 lead to different visual disabilities, the former resulting in an achromatopsia (acquired colour blindness) [ 8 ,9] and the latter in an akinetopsia [10,11] (acquired visual motion blindness) (Fig. 1). Crucially, a lesion…”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Bartels, 2002, The temporal limits of binding: is binding post-conscious?, Soc. Neurosci. Abstr., 260, 11
Cited by
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007 · Cited by 2,067
Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2007) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085709 · Cited by 1,425
“…core affect, as well as other cognitive contents like beliefs or memories, to bind together into a single experience (but for a dissenting view, see Dennett 1991, Zeki 2003).9 When people perceive some object or situation, they have a mental representation of something in the outside world.”
BackgroundAttentional Routes to Conscious Perception
Chica, A. B., & Bartolomeo, P. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00001 · Cited by 921
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869
A materialist theory of the mind
(2017) · Advances in Consciousness Research · doi:10.1075/aicr.95.c1 · Cited by 820
Metadata
- Authors
- Zeki, S.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Zeki, S.
- ORCID
- Zeki, S.
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-05
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 214-218
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2021731136
- Cited by
- 337
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 2.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- unity of consciousness, distributed consciousness, multiple consciousness, philosophy of mind, neuroscience of consciousness
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.