The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 59 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Abstract
Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the 'narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga's left-hemisphere 'interpreter' and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.
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In the citing paper
“We further hypothesized that brain areas selectively active during episodic memory recall would mediate specific aspects of remembering one's own past experiences including those related to self-schema (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Gallagher, 2000) and mental time travel (Tulving, 2002).”
From Using Imagination to Understand the Neural Basis of Episodic Memory (2007) · cites this paper as Gallagher, 2000
In the citing paper
“Moreover, by utilising rich imaginary memories as a well-matched comparison task we were able to isolate processes specific to episodic memory, such as the use of self-schema (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Gallagher, 2000), a sense of familiarity and mental time travel (Tulving, 2002).”
From Using Imagination to Understand the Neural Basis of Episodic Memory (2007) · cites this paper as Gallagher, 2000
In the citing paper
“Over time, an extended or narrative self emerges as the minimal self triggers encoding and recall of self-relevant memories, producing a continuous sense of self that links present experiences to the remembered past self and the imagined future self (Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000; B. Nelson, Parnas, et al., 2014).”
From Narrative identity in the psychosis spectrum: A systematic review and developmental model (2021) · cites this paper as Gallagher, 2000
In the citing paper
“However, there are significant overlaps between ToM and consciousness, particularly in the domains of selfawareness and social cognition:”
In the citing paper
“As such, cortical midline processes may be characterised as supporting narrative self-reference that maintains continuity of identity across time (Gallagher, 2004).”
From Attending to the present: mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neural modes of self-reference (2007) · cites this paper as Gallagher, 2004
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Cites
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- Strawson, 1997, The self, J. Conscious. Stud., 4, 405
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Cited by
A social neuroscience perspective on adolescent risk-taking
Steinberg, L. (2008) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2007.08.002 · Cited by 3,644
“…attractiveness, Aharon et al., 2001; evaluating race, Phelps et al., 2000; assessing others' intentions, Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1999; Gallagher, 2000), social reasoning (Rilling et al., 2002), and many other aspects of social information processing (for a review, see Adolphs, 2003).”
BackgroundThe functional architecture of human empathy
Decety, J., & Jackson, P. L. (2004) · Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews · doi:10.1177/1534582304267187 · Cited by 3,407
“These multiple connections confer on this region a role in the elaboration of an image of the body in space and in time (Benton & Silvan, 1993) on which the sense of agency depends (see Gallagher, 2000, for a theoretical account about the sense of agency).”
BackgroundGusnard, D. A., Akbudak, E., Shulman, G. L., & Raichle, M. E. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.071043098 · Cited by 2,997
Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & Panksepp, J. (2006) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002 · Cited by 2,792
“…''experiential self'' (Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Zahavi, 2003), ''prereflective self'' (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2005; Legrand, 2005), or ''minimal self'' (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher and Frith, 2003) (see also (Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Baars et al., 2003; Dalgleish, 2004; Marcel and Lambie, 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Sense of Embodiment in Virtual Reality
Kilteni, K., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2012) · Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments · doi:10.1162/pres_a_00124 · Cited by 1,713
“Body ownership refers to one’s self-attribution of a body (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Gallagher, S.
- Affiliations
- Canisius College (US)
- Corresponding author
- Gallagher, Shaun
- ORCID
- Gallagher, Shaun
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 14-21
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2126233790
- Cited by
- 2,881
- References
- 59
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 193 · 2024: 221 · 2023: 216 · 2022: 214 · 2021: 206 · 2020: 183 · 2019: 188 · 2018: 175 · 2017: 146 · 2016: 133 · 2015: 120 · 2014: 101 · 2013: 99 · 2012: 81
- FWCI
- 3.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- self, minimal self, narrative self, personal identity, self-agency, self-ownership, schizophrenia, robotics, episodic memory, philosophy of mind, temporal continuity
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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