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Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.

Gallagher, Shaun · 2000 · Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Abstract

Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the 'narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga's left-hemisphere 'interpreter' and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.

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Crossref · 10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Frith, 1999, Abnormalities in the perception and control of action, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B
  2. Strawson, 1997, The self, J. Conscious. Stud., 4, 405
  3. Dennett, D. (1988). Why everyone is a novelist. Times Literary Supplement Sept.16–22, pp. 1016, 1028–1029
  4. Pribram, 1999, Brain and the composition of conscious experience, J. Conscious. Stud., 6, 19

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Metadata

Authors
Gallagher, S.
Affiliations
Canisius College (US)
Corresponding author
Gallagher, Shaun
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2000-01
Volume
4
Issue
1
Pages
14-21
ISSN
1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2126233790
Cited by
2,881
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 174 · 2025: 193 · 2024: 221 · 2023: 216 · 2022: 214 · 2021: 206 · 2020: 183 · 2019: 188 · 2018: 175 · 2017: 146 · 2016: 133 · 2015: 120 · 2014: 101 · 2013: 99 · 2012: 81
FWCI
3.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
self, minimal self, narrative self, personal identity, self-agency, self-ownership, schizophrenia, robotics, episodic memory, philosophy of mind, temporal continuity

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5
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Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.