Elements of a developmental theory of imitation

Abstract

Imitation promises to be a hot research topic in the coming decade. Interest in imitation spread from a small band of aficionados to the broader community of cognitive scientists, evolutionary biologists, neuroscientists, philosophers, and developmental scientists. What is sparking such widespread growth in this topic? First, discoveries in developmental psychology have altered theories about the origins of imitation and its place in human nature. We used to think that humans gradually learned to imitate over the first several years of life. We now know that newborns can imitate body movements at birth. Such imitation reveals an innate link between observed and executed acts, with implications for brain science, and also reveals a primordial connection between the infant and caretaker, with implications for emotional development and intersubjectivity. Second, there has been a change in the perceived value of developmental research. In classical psychological theories the child's mind was regarded as the antithesis of the adult mind. Adults were viewed as rational, planful, and operating with coherent perceptions; whereas infants were portrayed as slaves of the here-and-now, devoid of reason, and experiencing James' “blooming, buzzing, confusion.” Scientists often assumed greater similarities between college students and rats than between college students and infants. This impeded scientists from using infants as informants about adult cognition. As experimental techniques improved, infants became good sources of information about fundamental principles of human thought. The increased value of developmental research brought studies of infant imitation to the foreground.