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Cited by 1,249Action Observation and SynchronizationEmbodied and Extended CognitionMental Health and Psychiatry

The roots of empathy: the shared manifold hypothesis and the neural basis of intersubjectivity

Gallese, Vittorio·2003·Psychopathology
DOI 10.1159/000072786
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Abstract

Starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will propose that our capacity to understand others as intentional agents, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, be deeply grounded in the relational nature of our interactions with the world. According to this hypothesis, an implicit, prereflexive form of understanding of other individuals is based on the strong sense of identity binding us to them. We share with our conspecifics a multiplicity of states that include actions, sensations and emotions. A new conceptual tool able to capture the richness of the experiences we share with others will be introduced: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. I will posit that it is through this shared manifold that it is possible for us to recognize other human beings as similar to us. It is just because of this shared manifold that intersubjective communication and ascription of intentionality become possible. It will be argued that the same neural structures that are involved in processing and controlling executed actions, felt sensations and emotions are also active when the same actions, sensations and emotions are to be detected in others. It therefore appears that a whole range of different "mirror matching mechanisms" may be present in our brain. This matching mechanism, constituted by mirror neurons originally discovered and described in the domain of action, could well be a basic organizational feature of our brain, enabling our rich and diversified intersubjective experiences. This perspective is in a position to offer a global approach to the understanding of the vulnerability to major psychoses such as schizophrenia.

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Crossref · 10.1159/000072786

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  • Empathy results from neural network activations that resemble those observed when the same emotion is experienced first-hand (shared network hypothesis).

    “This socio-affective process results from neural network activations that resemble those activations observed when the same emotion is experienced first-hand (shared network hypothesis) [2][3][4][5].”

    From On the interaction of social affect and cognition: empathy, compassion and theory of mind (2018) · cites this paper as [3]

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Authors
Gallese, V.
Venue
Psychopathology
Publisher
S. Karger AG
Published
2003
Volume
36
Issue
4
Pages
171-180
ISSN
  • 0254-4962 (ISSN-L)
  • 1423-033X
DOI
10.1159/000072786
OpenAlex
W2044954931
Cited by
1,249
References
52
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 43 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 56 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 58 · 2019: 56 · 2018: 43 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 70 · 2014: 62 · 2013: 71 · 2012: 63
FWCI
37.59
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • Psychopathology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
intersubjectivity, empathy, mirror neurons, intention attribution, action understanding, emotional understanding, schizophrenia vulnerability, psychosis
MeSH terms
Autistic Disorder, Brain, Communication, Emotions, Empathy, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological, Neurons, Schizophrenia, Self Concept, Social Behavior

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