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Physicalism and its Discontents
Abstract
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published in 2001, offers a series of perspectives on this important doctrine and brings depth and breadth to the philosophical debate. A group of distinguished philosophers, comprising both physicalists and their critics, consider a wide range of issues including the historical genesis and present justification of physicalism, its metaphysical presuppositions and methodological role, its implications for mental causation, and the account it provides of consciousness.
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Citations
Cited by
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction
Rosen, G. (2010) · Modality · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007 · Cited by 1,285
A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism
Melnyk, A. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498817 · Cited by 320
Mind Design and Minimal Syntax
Hinzen, W. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289257.001.0001 · Cited by 273
Trogdon, K. (2013) · Varieties of Dependence · doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzhj9.6 · Cited by 254
Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar, D. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001 · Cited by 191
Metadata
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2001-11-26
- OpenAlex
- W3142306434
- Cited by
- 344
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.59
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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