Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Abstract
This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as having its origin in our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. This change of orientation is shown to be well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and to have none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.
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Panpsychists hold that all matter possesses mental properties of some form.
“Panpsychists hold that all matter possesses mental properties of some form.”
From The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence (2014) · cites this paper as Stoljar 2006
Cites
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632 · see citing works
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Balog, K. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998286 · Cited by 242 · see citing works
Rosenberg, G. H. (2004) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.001.0001 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
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The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence
Coleman, S. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x · Cited by 206 · see citing works
Banks, E. C. (2010) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515081003690418 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Agnosticism about artificial consciousness
McClelland, T. (2026) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.70010 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
- Authors
- Stoljar, D.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Stoljar, Daniel
- ORCID
- Stoljar, Daniel
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2006-07-01
- OpenAlex
- W2497314384
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 30 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 5.03
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- problem of consciousness, phenomenal experience, naturalism, mind-body problem, ignorance, imagination, philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, philosophy and science, human place in nature
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