The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism
Abstract
A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue in detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence against physicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in a brisk, candid and exceptionally clear style, this 2003 book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of science.
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Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
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Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
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Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
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Cited by
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Bennett, K. (2011) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00207.x · Cited by 334
Construction area (no hard hat required)
Bennett, K. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9703-8 · Cited by 252
Huemer, M. (2009) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.569.x · Cited by 155
A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection
Elpidorou, A. (2016) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12068 · Cited by 23
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness
Mørch, H. H. (2024) · doi:10.1017/9781009317344 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Melnyk, A.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-10-09
- OpenAlex
- W561338601
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 3.76
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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