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Decision, Probability and Utility: Selected Readings
Abstract
Decision theory and the theory of rational choice have recently been the subjects of considerable research by philosophers and economists. However, no adequate anthology exists which can be used to introduce students to the field. This volume is designed to meet that need. The essays included are organized into five parts covering the foundations of decision theory, the conceptualization of probability and utility, pholosophical difficulties with the rules of rationality and with the assessment of probability, and causal decision theory. The editors provide an extensive introduction to the field and introductions to each part.
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Citations
Cited by
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Omission and commission in judgment and choice
Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-1031(91)90011-t · Cited by 1,041
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
Joyce, J. M. (1998) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392661 · Cited by 770
GOLDMAN, A. I. (1989) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1989.tb00249.x · Cited by 576
Metadata
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1988-03-25
- OpenAlex
- W1983424777
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 5.14
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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