The evolution of knowledge
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Human beings are one of the great success stories of evolution. They have spread over the globe and refashioned much of it to their own convenience. What has made this possible? Perhaps there is no one key which alone explains why humans have come to dominate nature. But a crucial part has surely been played by our high potential for theoretical rationality. Human beings far surpass other animals in their ability to form accurate beliefs across a wide range of topics, and many aspects of human civilisation rest on this accomplishment. My aim in this chapter will be to explain this ability from an evolutionary perspective. I want to understand how creatures with our biological history came to be so good at theoretical rationality. Introduction The claim that humans are good at theoretical rationality is not entirely uncontroversial. Much recent psychological research suggests that humans are far less good at forming accurate beliefs than you might initially suppose. I shall discuss this research at some length below. It raises many interesting issues and will force me to be more specific about the precise sense in which humans possess a high level of theoretical rationality. But this research does not in the end undermine the claim that humans do have a high degree of theoretical rationality, nor that this has played an important role in human development. Evolutionary explanations do not always account for traits in terms of elective advantages they provide.
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Selective pressures may have enhanced human capacities for rational reasoning in the domains of folk psychology and means-end reasoning, for example in our ability to discern causes.
“As David Papineau (2000) has suggested, selective pressures may have enhanced human capacities for rational reasoning in the domains of folk psychology and means-end reasoning, for example in our ability to discern causes.”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Papineau (2000)
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Research works printed but not linked: 11
- [1]1. J. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, 1992, The Adapted Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- [2]2. C. Cherniak, 1986, Minimal Rationality, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
- [4]4. A. Dickinson and B. Balleine, 1999, "Causal Cognition and Goal-Directed Action", in C. Heyes and L. Huber (eds) The Evolution of Cognition, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press
- [5]5. J. Evans and D. Over, 1996, Rationality and Reasoning, Hove, Psychology Press
- [7]7. Godfrey-Smith, 1991, "Signal, Detection, Action", Journal of Philosophy, 88
- [8]8. S. Gould and R. Lewontin, 1979. "The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Program", Proceedings of the Royal Society, B205
- [9]9. I. Hacking, 1975, The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- [11]11. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky, 1982, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- [13]13. D. Papineau, 1987, Reality and Representation, Oxford, Blackwell D. Papineau, 1993, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford, Blackwell D. Papineau, 1997, "Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75
- [15]15. R. Samuels, S. Stich and M. Bishop, forthcoming, "Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes about Human Rationality Disappear" D. Sperber, 1996, Explaining Culture, Oxford, Basil Blackwell E. Stein, 1996, Without Good Reason, Oxford, Clarendon Press
- [16]16. S. Stich, 19??, "Rationality", in ? M. Tomasello and J. Call, 1997, Primate Cognition, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification
De Cruz, H. (2011) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.x · Cited by 32 · see citing works
The influence of prior belief on scientific thinking
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.011 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
- Authors
- Papineau, D.
- Corresponding author
- Papineau, David
- ORCID
- Papineau, David
- Venue
- Evolution and the Human Mind
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-11-02
- Pages
- 170-206
- OpenAlex
- W1039100561
- Cited by
- 114
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2020: 3 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 92.19
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- sas-space.sas.ac.uk
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- SAS-Space (University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Research Portal (King's College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- theoretical rationality, human cognition, evolutionary explanation, belief formation, epistemic accuracy, evolutionary psychology, human evolution
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