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Cited by 32Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification

Open access
De Cruz, Helen·2011·dialectica
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.x
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Abstract

What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our sensory systems and belief-formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.x

Cites

59 of 59 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

4 of 38 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Premisecitation

    Some cognitive illusions may be adaptive.

    “Some cognitive illusions may be adaptive (McKay & Dennett, 2009).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites McKay & Dennett, 2009 source
  • Premisecitation

    The use of external media is not limited to contemporary societies, but seems to be a pervasive element of human cognition at least since the late Pleistocene, about 120,000 to 12,000 years ago.

    “The use of external media is not limited to contemporary societies, but seems to be a pervasive element of human cognition at least since the late Pleistocene (ca.120,000-12,000 years ago).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites De Smedt & De Cruz, 2011 source

      Section 3 (p. 6) states almost verbatim that external media have been a pervasive element of human cognition since the Late Pleistocene, which it dates to about 120,000 years ago. The citing sentence adds a 12,000-year endpoint that this passage does not give. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation

    Human newborns have a visual preference for face-like stimuli.

    “a wealth of experimental data from developmental psychology (e.g., Farroni et al., 2005) shows that human newborns have a visual preference for face-like stimuli.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Farroni et al., 2005 source
  • Premisecitation

    Selective pressures may have enhanced human capacities for rational reasoning in the domains of folk psychology and means-end reasoning, for example in our ability to discern causes.

    “As David Papineau (2000) has suggested, selective pressures may have enhanced human capacities for rational reasoning in the domains of folk psychology and means-end reasoning, for example in our ability to discern causes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Papineau (2000) source
  • Interpretationreasoning

    The cognitive capacity for agency detection generates an excess of false positives.

    “This cognitive capacity generates an excess of false positives.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 21
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 46

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Intuitive beliefs that have no bearing whatsoever on fitness are invisible to natural selection, and are thus unreliable.

    “Intuitive beliefs that have no bearing whatsoever on fitness are invisible to natural selection, and are thus unreliable.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Religious beliefs are byproducts of cognitive functions, such as agency detection and theory of mind.

    “Researchers in the cognitive science of religion have argued that religious beliefs are byproducts of cognitive functions, such as agency detection and theory of mind”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    EDAs of types i-iii rely on premise 4*, as they emphasize the disconnection between truth and fitness.

    “EDAs of types i-iii rely on premise 4*, as they emphasize the disconnection between truth and fitness.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given

    Natural selection is concerned with fitness, i.e., a propensity to produce a greater number of surviving offspring, not with truth.

    “Natural selection is concerned with fitness, i.e., a propensity to produce a greater number of surviving offspring, not with truth (premise 4*).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Natural selection is the only candidate for a truth-tracking evolutionary mechanism.

    “After all, natural selection is the only candidate for a truth-tracking evolutionary mechanism”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given

    Natural selection may get stuck on a local peak in a fitness landscape without being able to reach a better optimum.

    “it is possible that natural selection gets stuck on a local peak in a fitness landscape 6 without being able to reach a better optimum.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The belief of devoted parents that their own children are more beautiful, smarter and kinder than average (the Lake Wobegon effect) is clearly unjustified as not every child can be above average.

    “The belief of devoted parents that their own children are more beautiful, smarter and kinder than average (the Lake Wobegon effect) is clearly unjustified as not every child can be above average”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    A false positive is less costly than a false negative, as the latter can result in a failure to detect a dangerous predator, a prey, or a potential mate, and the former only results in a small waste of time and energy.

    “The evolutionary rationale for this is that a false positive is less costly than a false negative, as the latter can result in a failure to detect a dangerous predator, a prey, or a potential mate, and the former only results in a small waste of time and energy (Guthrie, 1993).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Guthrie, 1993 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The Lake Wobegon effect may contribute to the time and energy parents invest in their children, thereby enhancing their inclusive fitness.

    “but it may contribute to the time and energy parents invest in their children, thereby enhancing their inclusive fitness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The fitting mutations may fail to arise at the right time, or pleiotropic effects and drift may result in cognitive mechanisms that are not fitness-enhancing.

    “the fitting mutations may fail to arise at the right time, or pleiotropic effects 4 and drift 5 may result in cognitive mechanisms that are not fitness-enhancing.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Stich, 1990

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    EDAs of type iv rely on premise 6*.

    “By contrast, EDAs of type iv rely on premise 6*.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    There would be no good reason to assume that scientific theories are justified, or that philosophical reflection and argumentation provides us with sound conceptual knowledge.

    “There would be no good reason to assume that scientific theories are justified, or that philosophical reflection and argumentation (such as an EDA) provides us with sound conceptual knowledge.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning

    Trade-offs may occur between utility and expenses in time and resources, resulting in cognitive systems that are less than reliable.

    “trade-offs may occur between utility on the one hand and expenses in time and resources on the other, resulting in cognitive systems that are less than reliable.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Empirical evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive science indicates that many elements of religious beliefs arise early in development and are stably present across cultures.

    “Empirical evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive science indicates that many elements of religious beliefs arise early in development, and are stably present across cultures”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Guthrie, 1993 source
    • cites Bering, 2006 source
    • cites Kelemen, 2004 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    If being a byproduct undermined religious beliefs, science would likewise be undermined.

    “if that were so, one could argue that science, which is also a byproduct of the evolved structure of human cognition, is likewise undermined.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Cognitive mechanisms may have come about through sexual selection.

    “cognitive mechanisms may also have come about through sexual selection, i.e., through the interaction of phenotypes not with the environment, but with the fancy of the opposite sex (Miller, 2000).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Miller, 2000

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Natural selection is just one among many evolutionary forces, and there are lots of factors that may interfere with it, giving rise to nonadaptive traits.

    “an EDA based on 6* argues that natural selection is just one among many evolutionary forces, and there are lots of factors that may interfere with it, giving rise to nonadaptive traits”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Stich, 1990

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    EAs posit that successful (fitness-enhancing) action requires accurate beliefs.

    “A second potential problem for EAs is that they posit that successful (fitnessenhancing) action requires accurate beliefs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    According to EDAs based on 4*, the fact that cognitive processes function to promote survival and reproduction should lead us to doubt the accuracy of our beliefs.

    “According to EDAs based on 4*, this should lead us to doubt the accuracy of our beliefs.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Natural selection is primarily concerned with fitness, not with tracking truths.

    “An EDA on the basis of 4* emphasizes that natural selection is primarily concerned with fitness 2 , not with tracking truths.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Plantinga, 1993 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Taking into account scenarios in which premise 4 or premise 6 of EA fails, evolution has become more of a latter day Cartesian demon.

    “Taking into account all these scenarios in which either premise 4 or premise 6 (or both) of EA fails to obtain, it seems that evolution has become more of a latter day Cartesian demon.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Most EDAs are less wide in scope than Plantinga's.

    “However, most EDAs are less wide in scope than Plantinga's.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    The most successful EAs offered to date are in the domain of commonsense beliefs.

    “The most successful EAs offered to date are in the domain of commonsense beliefs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    EAs and EDAs share several premises but reach contradictory conclusions.

    “Although EAs and EDAs share several premises, they reach contradictory conclusions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    As general strategies both justification and debunking are problematic.

    “However, as general strategies both justification and debunking are problematic.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Evolutionary theories of mental content propose that the proper function of our cognitive processes is to promote survival and reproduction.

    “Evolutionary theories of mental content propose that the 'proper' function of our cognitive processes is to promote survival and reproduction (e.g., Millikan, 1984).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Millikan, 1984 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    EDAs can cast doubt on the premise that successful action requires accurate beliefs.

    “As we shall see in the next subsection, EDAs can cast doubt on this premise.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    Evolutionary approaches to the mind have given rise to two mutually incompatible positions.

    “Evolutionary approaches to the mind have given rise to two mutually incompatible positions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    Natural selection may produce risk-aversive and thus error-prone cognitive mechanisms, as in the detection of predators.

    “Natural selection may, for instance, produce risk-aversive and thus error-prone cognitive mechanisms, as in the detection of predators”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    If scientific and philosophical beliefs belong to the type of beliefs that have no bearing on fitness, and if EDAs indeed affect any such beliefs, then even fine-grained EDAs that rely on premise 6* are potentially self-defeating.

    “But if scientific and philosophical beliefs belong to the type of beliefs that have no bearing on fitness, and if EDAs indeed affect any such beliefs, then even fine-grained EDAs that rely on premise 6* are potentially self-defeating.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Circularity can be avoided by a careful rephrasing of evolutionary arguments and by reliance on observations outside the domain of evolutionary theory.

    “In sum, circularity can be avoided by a careful rephrasing of EAs, and by reliance on observations outside the domain of evolutionary theory.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Faulty reasoning is often corrigible with some mental effort.

    “and that faulty reasoning is often corrigible with some mental effort.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    There seems to be little to distinguish between the naturalistic explanation (by appeal to evolutionary theory) and the theistic explanation (by appeal to Christian revelation).

    “there seems to be little to distinguish between the naturalistic explanation (by appeal to evolutionary theory) and the theistic explanation (by appeal to Christian revelation).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    This position is committed to scientific naturalism, which argues that epistemological questions should be approached through empirical science rather than through a priori philosophy.

    “This position is committed to scientific naturalism, which argues that epistemological questions should be approached through empirical science rather than through a priori philosophy.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    There is little reason to expect that our ability for philosophical reflection is subject to natural selection.

    “Likewise, there is little reason to expect that our ability for philosophical reflection is subject to natural selection.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Once humans were able to outsource their measurement of temperature to the outside world, they were able to measure temperature in a more objective way and in a much more precise fashion than if they relied on their evolved capacities alone.

    “Once humans were able to outsource their measurement of temperature to the outside world, they were not only able to measure temperature in a more objective way, but also in a much more precise fashion than if they relied on their evolved capacities alone.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    If the extended mind is a key feature of human cognitive evolution, it might be possible to justify non-commonsense beliefs through evolutionary arguments, namely as those beliefs that reliably arise through the judicious use of external media which can counter cognitive biases.

    “If the extended mind is indeed a key feature of human cognitive evolution, it might be possible to justify non-commonsense beliefs through EAs, namely as those beliefs that reliably arise through the judicious use of external media which can counter cognitive biases.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Artifacts such as books, journals, electronic storage devices, measuring instruments, calendars, or simple tallies allow us to store information that is cognitively challenging to memorize and protect it from memory distortion.

    “Artifacts, such as books, journals, electronic storage devices, measuring instruments, calendars, or even simple tallies, allow us to store information that is cognitively challenging to memorize, and to protect it from memory distortion.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Long-term episodic memories typically get distorted over time, which poses severe limitations on their reliability.

    “Adaptive as this may be, it poses severe limitations on the reliability of our long-term episodic memories, which typically get distorted over time.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation

    It is possible to have an interdependence of justifications (P, Q, R) in which we start out by an initially very weak and provisional version of P, in which our confidence is gradually raised as evidence accumulates (through Q and R).

    “However, it is possible to have an interdependence of justifications (P, Q, R) in which we start out by an initially very weak and provisional version of P, in which our confidence is gradually raised as evidence accumulates (through Q and R).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    One plausible solution is that, although higher-order theories as proposed in scientific and philosophical practice may be fitness-neutral, the cognitive skills they are based on need not be.

    “One plausible solution is that, although higher-order theories as proposed in scientific and philosophical practice may be fitness-neutral, the cognitive skills they are based on need not be.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation

    One possible way out of the circularity problem is simply to grant the reliability of our inductive capacities as given.

    “One possible way out of the circularity problem is simply to grant the reliability of our inductive capacities as given.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    If we accept that everything that is not directly adaptive or fitness-enhancing will be affected by an EDA, then EDAs of this type will inevitably bloat out to a lot of other beliefs as well, undermining their own coherence and leading one to doubt the cogency of scientific theories and philosophical argumentation.

    “Thus, if we accept that everything that is not directly adaptive or fitness-enhancing will be affected by an EDA, then EDAs of this type will inevitably bloat out to a lot of other beliefs as well, undermining their own coherence and leading one to doubt the cogency of scientific theories and philosophical argumentation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The accusation of vicious circularity holds only when the circle is completely closed, i.e., when we have no other reasons at all to accept any of the propositions involved.

    “the accusation of vicious circularity holds only when the circle is completely closed, i.e., when we have no other reasons at all to accept any of the propositions involved.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Clendinnen (1989)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Sterelny argues that humans construct their own cognitive niche using artifacts to suit epistemic purposes.

    “Kim Sterelny (2003) incorporates theories of niche construction in human cognitive evolution, arguing that, just as termites build their own environment, humans construct their own cognitive niche using artifacts to suit epistemic purposes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Sterelny, 2003

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Rhesus monkeys can perform this categorization in a very brief period, with pictures flashed for 80 ms, and are correct in approximately 90% of trials.

    “Moreover, they can do this in a very brief period (pictures are flashed for a duration of only 80 ms), and they are correct in approximately 90 % of the trials.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Our heavy investment in big brains and otherwise mediocre bodies makes it all the more unlikely that resources would be wasted on elaborate belief-forming and processing mechanisms that have no practical utility.

    “Our heavy investment in big brains and otherwise mediocre bodies makes it all the more unlikely that resources would be wasted on elaborate belief-forming and processing mechanisms that have no practical utility (Fales, 1996, 440).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fales, 1996 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Clendinnen believes that there are two reasons, independent from natural facts, for accepting the principle of induction as minimally rational: the criterion of non-arbitrariness and the principle of simplicity.

    “In particular, Clendinnen (1989) believes that there are two reasons, independent from natural facts, for accepting the principle of induction as minimally rational: the criterion of non-arbitrariness and the principle of simplicity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Clendinnen (1989)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    These observations do not rely on the supposition that evolutionary theory is correct, but they strengthen evolutionary arguments for the reliability of our beliefs.

    “These observations do not rely on the supposition that evolutionary theory is correct, but they do strengthen evolutionary arguments for the reliability of our beliefs.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Over the past decades, evolutionary psychologists have used findings from neuroscience and cognitive, comparative and developmental psychology to test evolutionary hypotheses.

    “Over the past decades, evolutionary psychologistsfoot_4 have used findings from neuroscience and cognitive, comparative and developmental psychology to test evolutionary hypotheses (see e.g., Dunbar & Barrett, 2007).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dunbar & Barrett, 2007

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    By starting from a minimally rational principle of induction, we may accumulate evidence, including evolutionary theory, that itself lends support to the efficacy of induction.

    “by starting from a minimally rational principle of induction, we may accumulate evidence (including evolutionary theory) that itself lends support to the efficacy of induction”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Clendinnen 1989

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Many forms of self-dependent justification are not circular but are unproblematic forms of Bayesian confirmation.

    “He argues that many forms of self-dependent justification are in fact not circular-rather, they are unproblematic forms of Bayesian confirmation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Shogenji 2000 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The circularity charge, an important challenge faced by EAs, should be addressed.

    “Therefore, the circularity charge, an important challenge faced by EAs, should be addressed.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Human episodic recall may be biased, but humans can mitigate this by using external memory systems.

    “human episodic recall may be biased, but humans can mitigate this by using external memory systems.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Clendinnen argued that this part of the project of evolutionary epistemology will be inevitably circular, but it need not be viciously so.

    “F. John Clendinnen (1989) has argued that this part of the project of evolutionary epistemology will be inevitably circular, but it need not be viciously so.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Clendinnen (1989)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Interdependence by itself is not sufficient to establish vicious circularity.

    “According to him, interdependence by itself is not sufficient to establish vicious circularity.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Clendinnen (1989)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    In a deductive model of justification, it is often incorrectly assumed that each step is either completely justified or not justified at all.

    “In a deductive model of justification, it is often incorrectly assumed that each step is either completely justified or not justified at all.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    This externalist position holds that we need not know that beliefs are justified; it suffices that our cognitive processes are reliable to make them justified.

    “This is an externalist position: we need not know that beliefs are justified, it suffices that our cognitive processes are reliable to make them justified.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation

    With the efficacy of induction taken for granted, and bearing in mind the success of the naturalistic program in science, the naturalist can argue that evolution by natural selection indeed explains induction better than a theistic first cause.

    “With the efficacy of induction taken for granted, and bearing in mind the success of the naturalistic program in science, the naturalist can then argue that evolution by natural selection indeed explains induction better than a theistic first cause (Boudry et al., 2010).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Boudry et al., 2010 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Neuroscience and other scientific disciplines do not deliver brute facts, but require interpreting, cognizing minds.

    “After all, neuroscience and other scientific disciplines do not deliver brute facts, but require interpreting, cognizing minds.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    A weakness of this strategy is the problem of cheap knowledge, which is common to externalist positions in epistemology.

    “A weakness of this strategy is the problem of cheap knowledge, which is common to externalist positions in epistemology.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
61 of 61

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There is some link between the truth of a belief and its adaptive value.

    “Even if we assume that there is some link between the truth of a belief and its adaptive value (premise 4)”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Beliefs are partly though indirectly under genetic control.

    “that beliefs are partly though indirectly under genetic control”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Natural selection is the primary drive of evolution.

    “and that natural selection is the primary drive of evolution (premise 6)”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Evolutionary theory presents our current best hope to explain design and adaptation from a naturalistic point of view.

    “Since evolutionary theory presents our current best hope to explain design and adaptation from a naturalistic point of view”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Naturalistic explanations have been consistently successful.

    “In contrast to supernatural accounts, naturalistic explanations have been consistently successful.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Internal coherence is an important epistemic virtue.

    “If we accept internal coherence as an important epistemic virtue”
6 of 6

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Dawkins, 2006, The God Delusion
  2. Quine, 1975, Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures, 67

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Authors
De Cruz, H.
Venue
dialectica
Publisher
Verein philosophie.ch
Published
2011
Volume
65
Issue
4
Pages
517-535
ISSN
0012-2017 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.x
OpenAlex
W2108951629
Semantic Scholar
5c84109b12a04e72c47727be15631f7f7cdddde5
Cited by
32
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 3
FWCI
21.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 1704 d)
Locations
  • dialectica (publishedVersion)
  • Ghent University Academic Bibliography (Ghent University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
  • Universiteit Gent
  • Vlaamse regering
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
epistemic justification, evolutionary theory, naturalized epistemology, cognitive biases, skepticism, circularity, externalism, belief formation, sensory perception

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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