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Trust within Reason
Abstract
Some philosophers hold that trust grows fragile when people become too rational. They advocate a retreat from reason and a return to local, traditional values. Others hold that truly rational people are both trusting and trustworthy. Everything hinges on what we mean by 'reason' and 'rational'. If these are understood in an egocentric, instrumental fashion, then they are indeed incompatible with trust. With the help of game theory, Martin Hollis argues against that narrow definition and in favour of a richer, deeper notion of reason founded on reciprocity and the pursuit of the common good. Within that framework he reconstructs the Enlightenment idea of citizens of the world, rationally encountering, and at the same time finding their identity in, their multiple commitments to communities both local and universal.
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Citations
Cited by
Kim, D. J., Ferrin, D. L., & Rao, H. R. (2008) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2007.07.001 · Cited by 3,613
The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View
Tuomela, R. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.001.0001 · Cited by 840
Measuring Patients’ Trust in their Primary Care Providers
Hall, M. A., Zheng, B., Dugan, E., Camacho, F., Kidd, K. E., Mishra, A., & Balkrishnan, R. (2002) · Medical Care Research and Review · doi:10.1177/1077558702059003004 · Cited by 661
Who trusts: the origins of social trust in seven societies.
Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2003) · European Societies · doi:10.1080/1461669032000072256 · Cited by 628
Trust, Untrust, Distrust and Mistrust – An Exploration of the Dark(er) Side
Marsh, S., & Dibben, M. R. (2005) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11429760_2 · Cited by 188
Metadata
- Authors
- Hollis, M.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1998-03-05
- OpenAlex
- W2087167323
- Cited by
- 510
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 65.31
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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