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Freedom within Reason
Abstract
Abstract In this work, the author argues that, contrary to the tradition in analytic philosophy, freedom of the will cannot be understood as a purely metaphysical notion. You enjoy freedom of the will only if you are in a position that enables you, not only to govern your actions on the basis of your own values, but also to develop and alter your values on the basis of the right data and by the right means. Accordingly, free will is the freedom to be good, or the freedom to do the right thing for the right reasons. This approach allows us to explain the failure of attempts to provide satisfactory metaphysical accounts of free will, whether compatibilist or in-compatilist: the metaphysical conditions of freedom of the will vary in accordance with the value of the action in question.
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Citations
Cited by
Kane, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 · Cited by 1,316
RYAN, R. M., KUHL, J., & DECI, E. L. (1997) · Development and Psychopathology · doi:10.1017/s0954579497001405 · Cited by 622
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them
Santoni de Sio, F., & Mecacci, G. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x · Cited by 490
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility
Shoemaker, D. (2011) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/659003 · Cited by 454
Metadata
- Authors
- Wolf, S.
- Venue
- Personal Autonomy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2005-01-10
- Pages
- 258-274
- OpenAlex
- W1982424145
- Cited by
- 834
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Freedom within Reason. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511614194.012
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- Wolf, S. (2005). Freedom within Reason. Personal Autonomy. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511614194.012
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
