The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Open accessAbstract
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people's prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research.
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Cites
Journal of Consciousness Studies
(2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201 · Cited by 6,832
Strawson, P. F. (1962) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 3,223
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023833 · Cited by 2,405
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249 · cited 2×
“[45] This view is similar to van Inwagen’s (1983) view, dubbed ‘‘metaphysical flip-flopping’’ by Fischer & Ravizza (1998), that if he were convinced determinism were true, he would become a compatibilist rather than a skeptic about free will.”
BackgroundMethodPereboom, D. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498824 · Cited by 1,519
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
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Cited by
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x · Cited by 558
Mele, A. R. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195305043.001.0001 · Cited by 493
THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Kauppinen, A. (2007) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 · Cited by 324
Cullen, S. (2010) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0016-1 · Cited by 225
Monroe, A. E., Dillon, K. D., & Malle, B. F. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.011 · Cited by 125
Metadata
- Authors
- Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-10
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 561-584
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2157054559
- Cited by
- 526
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 6.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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