The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice
Abstract
Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firm's management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker-controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker-controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter.
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Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
North, D. C. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808678 · Cited by 32,691
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
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Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Williamson, O. E. (1991) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393356 · Cited by 7,151
Participation and Democratic Theory
Pateman, C. (1970) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511720444 · Cited by 6,159
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise
Chandler, A. D. (1992) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.6.3.79 · Cited by 847
On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies
Hart, O. D. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911950 · Cited by 142
Cited by
Cheney, G., Santa Cruz, I., Peredo, A. M., & Nazareno, E. (2014) · Organization · doi:10.1177/1350508414539784 · Cited by 307
Metadata
- Authors
- Dow, G. K.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-02-17
- OpenAlex
- W4211005037
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 5.47
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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