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Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Abstract
Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
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“From a theoretical standpoint, Algeria's reform synthesizes elements of Institutional Economics, New Public Management, and Public Value Theory (North, 1990;Moore, 1995).”
From BUDGETARY REFORM IN ALGERIA UNDER THE ORGANIC LAW NO. 18-15: TOWARDS A RESULTS-ORIENTED FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE (2025) · cites this paper as North, 1990
In the citing paper
“groups to act in their collective interest depends on the quality of the formal institutions under which they reside (North 1990).”
From Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy (2000) · cites this paper as North 1990
In the citing paper
“Institutional Theory posits that economic performance and developmental outcomes are primarily determined by the quality and effectiveness of institutions, which include formal rules, regulations, governance structures, and informal norms guiding societal behavior (North, 1990; Rodrik et al., 2004).”
From STATE CAPACITY, INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2026) · cites this paper as North, 1990
In the citing paper
“These institutions manage transaction costs, uncertainty, coordination, and other relevant aspects in the formation and exchange of property rights, as well as the manner and efficiency with which production and consumption incentives are mobilized (Huylenbroeck et al., 2009; Menard, 1995; North, 1990).”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as North, 1990
In the citing paper
“Institutional change is difficult to accomplish, because it requires coordination on a large scale, which is often costly to early adopters [91,92].”
From The natural selection of bad science (2016) · cites this paper as [91]
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Cited by
The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1998.1255632 · Cited by 9,943
Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View Of Trust
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1998.926617 · Cited by 10,274
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399555954 · Cited by 7,879
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics
Pierson, P. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586011 · Cited by 8,094
“This matrix, he emphasizes, "produces massive increasing returns" (North 1990a, 95).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- North, D. C.
- Affiliations
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- Corresponding author
- North, Douglass C.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1990-10-26
- OpenAlex
- W4298413470
- Cited by
- 32,691
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3354 · 2025: 2285 · 2024: 1479 · 2023: 1367 · 2022: 1422 · 2021: 1610 · 2020: 1650 · 2019: 1667 · 2018: 1477 · 2017: 1363 · 2016: 1259 · 2015: 1270 · 2014: 1180 · 2013: 982 · 2012: 1024
- FWCI
- 86.42
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
- Keywords
- institutions, institutional change, economic performance, transaction costs, production costs, path dependence, economic development, economic stagnation, incentive structures, economic history, neoclassical economics, economic growth
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511808678
- The paper
- North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511808678
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.