Simulation, Theory and Content
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
INTRODUCTION Some, the theory theorists, say that when we make judgements about the psychological states of others and use such judgements to predict or explain, we employ some theory about the psychological. But others, the simulationists, say that we possess no such theory, or at least none complete enough to underpin all our competence with psychological notions. Rather, they say, what we do in such situations is ‘simulate’ others' mental states and processes in ourselves and thus gain insight into what others are likely to do. My aim in this essay is first to offer an argument in favour of simulationism and second to suggest possible limits to the simulationist strategy. I shall suggest that simulation must be central as far as dealing with the contents of others' mental states is concerned, but is much less clearly of relevance in dealing with non-content. Thus, philosophers and psychologists should not oppose simulation to theory, but rather should ask what is the appropriate realm of each and how they interact. The topic throughout is the nature of the fully developed adult competence with psychological notions, in the context of predicting others' future psychological states and actions on the basis of knowledge about their current psychological states. I shall not discuss the (it seems to me) importantly different question of how we arrive at judgements about others' thoughts, feelings and so on from knowledge of their placement in the environment or bodily behaviour.
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SAXE, R., & WEXLER, A. (2005) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.02.013 · Cited by 926
Carpendale, J. I. M., & Lewis, C. (2004) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000032 · Cited by 865
The Link between Social Cognition and Self-referential Thought in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex
Mitchell, J. P., Banaji, M. R., & Macrae, C. N. (2005) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/0898929055002418 · Cited by 806
Self-Referential Cognition and Empathy in Autism
Lombardo, M. V., Barnes, J. L., Wheelwright, S. J., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2007) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000883 · Cited by 439
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind
(2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Metadata
- Venue
- Mind, Reason and Imagination
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-03-31
- Pages
- 45-62
- OpenAlex
- W964586474
- Cited by
- 69
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 13.60
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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