The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind presents a guide on the philosophy of mind. The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. A leading international team of contributors offer forty-five critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2010) · Mind, Language and Reality · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251.014 · Cited by 3,767
Laws and explanation in history
Dray, W. H. (1957) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 724
Burge, T. (1989) · Rerepresentation · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2649-3_3 · Cited by 452
SUPERVENIENCE AS A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT*
Kim, J. (1990) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1990.tb00830.x · Cited by 353
Davidson, D. (1974) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-02110-9_2 · Cited by 258
DRETSKE, F. I. (1989) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214261 · Cited by 137
Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical
McLaughlin, B. P. (1989) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214265 · Cited by 126
Simulation, Theory and Content
(2003) · Mind, Reason and Imagination · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615894.006 · Cited by 69
The Rational Character of Belief and the Argument for Mental Anomalism
Tiffany, E. (2001) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1010337509554 · Cited by 2
Cited by
DeYoung, C. G. (2015) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2014.07.004 · Cited by 1,057
Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
Chalmers, D. J. (2011) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzr046 · Cited by 113
Information Closure Theory of Consciousness
Chang, A. Y. C., Biehl, M., Yu, Y., & Kanai, R. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01504 · Cited by 64
Did the universe design itself?
Goff, P. (2019) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-018-9692-z · Cited by 62
I’ll die with the Hammer in my hand”: John Henryism as a predictor of happiness
Angner, E., Hullett, S., & Allison, J. J. (2011) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.01.002 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-01-15
- OpenAlex
- W1599005955
- Cited by
- 367
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 22.51
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001
- The paper
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. (2009). Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.