The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ownership of the firm
Abstract
Introduction Most large-scale enterprise in the United States is organized in the form of the conventional business corporation, in which the firm is collectively owned by investors of capital. Other ownership patterns are prominent in a number of important industries, however. Many firms, for example, are owned by their customers. These include not just consumer retail cooperatives, which are relatively rare, but also business-owned wholesale and supply cooperatives, which are quite common, as well as public utility cooperatives, mutual insurance companies, mutual banking institutions, and cooperative and condominium housing. Further, many firms are owned by persons who supply the firm with some factor of production other than capital. Worker-owned firms, which predominate in professional services such as law and accounting, are conspicuous examples, as are the agricultural processing and marketing cooperatives that dominate the markets for many farm products. Finally, a number of important service industries are heavily populated by nonprofit firms, which have no owners at all. In this essay I explore the economic factors responsible for these different patterns of ownership. In recent years a number of scholars have explored various aspects of enterprise ownership. In particular, Williamson and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian have dealt insightfully with the influence of transactionspecific investments on the assignment of ownership, and I shall draw heavily here on the concepts they have developed. Similarly, a number of writers have looked at questions of ownership in particular contexts.
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827
The market for corporate control
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1 · Cited by 4,141
(1970) · Cited by 3,618
Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Williamson, O. E. (1993) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.4090140203 · Cited by 593
Mahoney, J. T. (1992) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250130802 · Cited by 457
Why are cooperatives important in agriculture? An organizational economics perspective
VALENTINOV, V. (2007) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137406000555 · Cited by 320
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND FARM SUSTAINABILITY – A LITERATURE REVIEW
Candemir, A., Duvaleix, S., & Latruffe, L. (2021) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12417 · Cited by 287
Metadata
- Authors
- Hansmann, H.
- Venue
- Corporate Law and Economic Analysis
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1990-10-26
- Pages
- 281-314
- OpenAlex
- W1886488638
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 21.28
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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