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Contracting for Property Rights
Abstract
In this book the author examines the problems encountered in negotiations among claimants and the political and economic considerations that influence property rights arrangements. The histories of mineral rights, rights to range and timber land, as well as fishery and crude oil production rights in the United States are examined and reveal a surprising variety of contractual negotiations and economic outcomes. The author concludes that in addition to an analysis of distributional outcomes, an examination of the details of the political bargaining underlying property rights contracts is essential to an understanding of why rights emerge as they do. The book is an important contribution to both property rights theory and to American economic history.
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Citations
Cited by
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Beritelli, P., Bieger, T., & Laesser, C. (2007) · Journal of Travel Research · doi:10.1177/0047287507302385 · Cited by 389
Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?
Greif, A., & Kingston, C. (2011) · Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8_2 · Cited by 270
Comparing theories of institutional change
KINGSTON, C., & CABALLERO, G. (2009) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137409001283 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Libecap, G. D.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1990-01-26
- OpenAlex
- W4301036019
- Cited by
- 564
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.93
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Contracting for Property Rights. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511664120
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- Libecap, G. D. (1990). Contracting for Property Rights. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511664120
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
