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Comparing theories of institutional change

KINGSTON, CHRISTOPHER, CABALLERO, GONZALO·2009·Journal of Institutional Economics
DOI 10.1017/s1744137409001283
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Abstract

This article compares a variety of theoretical approaches to conceptualizing institutional change. Our goal is neither to discover the ‘best’ theory, nor to attempt to build a new one. Rather, we wish to compare how the theories we consider agree or differ with respect to the causes, process, and outcomes of institutional change. Some of the theories we discuss emphasize the deliberate creation of institutions through the political process, while others emphasize the spontaneous emergence of institutions through evolutionary processes. Still others combine elements of evolution and design. We differentiate a variety of approaches to conceptualizing the interaction between formal and informal rules. We discuss recent theories based on the ‘Equilibrium View’ of institutions, and theories emphasizing the role of habit, learning, and bounded rationality. We also consider theoretical explanations for institutional inertia and path-dependence.

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Metadata

Authors
KINGSTON, C., & CABALLERO, G.
Venue
Journal of Institutional Economics
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2009-08
Volume
5
Issue
2
Pages
151-180
ISSN
  • 1744-1374
  • 1744-1382
DOI
10.1017/s1744137409001283
Cited by
254
References
2
Language
en
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified)

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