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The Economics of Organised Crime
Abstract
This is the first book to use economic theory in the analysis of all the different aspects of organised crime: the origins, the internal organisation, market behaviour and deterrence policies. The theory of rent-seeking is adopted to help understand the origin of criminal organisations from a state of anarchy, while modern industrial organisation theory is used to explain the design of internal rules in the organised crime sector. The market behaviour of organised crime is analysed taking into account its double nature of competitive firm and of monopolist on rule-making. Finally, the 'crime and economics' approach is applied to the analysis of corruption that occurs when the organised crime sector and the government collude to exploit their monopoly on rule-making. This book provides a careful balance between theoretical and institutional or empirical contributions. Each chapter outlines the normative results of the analysis in order to design more sophisticated deterrence policies.
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Citations
Cited by
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Conceptualizing Criminal Governance
Lessing, B. (2021) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592720001243 · Cited by 417
An‐arrgh‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization
Leeson, P. T. (2007) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/526403 · Cited by 343
The Economic Costs of Organised Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy
Pinotti, P. (2015) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12235 · Cited by 342
SKARBEK, D. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000335 · Cited by 336
Metadata
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1996-02-23
- OpenAlex
- W1600606581
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.98
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Economics of Organised Crime. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511751882
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- The Economics of Organised Crime. (1996). Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511751882
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.