The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion
Abstract
Civil war is fought between two political organizations, the state and a rebel group. Myriad theories of civil war have examined the role of state institutions and state strength, but little attention has been devoted to theorizing about rebel organizations themselves. The organizational structure of rebel groups is examined to understand patterns of recruitment and allegiance. Drawing on principal-agent analysis of participation and incentive compatibility constraints and the analytical tradition of rent-seeking contests, a model is developed to demonstrate that three factors—geography, ethnicity, and ideology—play an important role in determining military success, deterring defection within the rebel group, and shaping recruitment.
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Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
Greed and grievance in civil war
Collier, P. (2004) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064 · Cited by 6,101
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992
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Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Fearon, J. D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043770 · Cited by 1,306
Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2000) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081800551398 · Cited by 1,108
Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
Kuran, T. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116762 · Cited by 905
Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy
Miller, G. J. (1992) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173742 · Cited by 859
A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections
Grossman, H. I. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 808
Cited by
Introducing ACLED: An armed conflict location and event dataset
Raleigh, C., Linke, A., Hegre, H., & Karlsen, J. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310378914 · Cited by 1,747
Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison
CEDERMAN, L.-E., WEIDMANN, N. B., & GLEDITSCH, K. S. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000207 · Cited by 1,028
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084161 · Cited by 978
Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War
Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00322.x · Cited by 760
Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War
Walter, B. F. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043775 · Cited by 690
Metadata
- Authors
- GATES, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2002-02
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 111-130
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2168033512
- Cited by
- 586
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 20.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
