Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion
Open accessAbstract
This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as helping to explain many complex, real-world puzzles. In this volume, it is brought to bear on phenomena as diverse as the principles of legal compensation, the equity premium puzzle in financial markets, and the number of hours that New York cab drivers choose to drive on rainy days. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, this volume shows how prospect theory has matured into a new science of decision making.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The expected utility form for risk preferences does not explain risk preferences over small stakes.
“As previously noted, the expected utility form for risk preferences does not explain risk preferences over small stakes, as argued by Rabin [2000].”
From Personality Psychology and Economics (2011) · cites this paper as Rabin [2000]
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524 · see citing works
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · Cited by 5,019 · see citing works
An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods
Gneezy, U., & Potters, J. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555217 · Cited by 1,288 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Personality Psychology and Economics
Almlund, M., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J., & Kautz, T. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16822 · Cited by 540 · see citing works
Natural selection and the regulation of defenses
Nesse, R. M. (2005) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.002 · Cited by 365 · see citing works
- Authors
- Rabin, M.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rabin, Matthew
- Venue
- Choices, Values, and Frames
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-25
- Pages
- 202-208
- OpenAlex
- W2122052893
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 5 · 2014: 11 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 1.97
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.escholarship.org
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
- Game Theory and Information (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Keywords
- prospect theory, risk aversion, utility theory, decision making under uncertainty, Amos Tversky, legal compensation, equity premium puzzle, rational choice
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review