Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 166 of the 166 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
As its name implies, the heuristics and biases approach to human judgment has both positive and negative agendas (Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001). The positive agenda is to identify the mental operations that yield rapid and compelling solutions to a host of everyday judgmental problems. Most notably, Kahneman and Tversky identified a small number of automatic assessments – similarity, generation of examples, causal judgments – that are made rapidly in response to particular problems and thus exert considerable influence on the judgments that are ultimately rendered (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When ascertaining the likelihood that someone is an engineer, for example, one cannot help but assess the similarity between the person in question and the prototypical engineer, and the resultant assessment is, at the very least, the starting point for the judgment of likelihood. Thus, the positive agenda is to understand what the processes of judgment are like. The negative agenda is to understand what the processes of judgment are not like. Because assessments of similarity, the generation of examples, and causal judgments obey their own logic, everyday judgment will not always be fully “rational” and will not always conform to the laws of probability. Thus, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that people's judgments are insufficiently sensitive to sample size, regression effects, prior odds, or, more generally, the reliability and diagnosticity of evidence. Their experiments were carefully crafted to reveal discrepancies between intuitive judgment and what is called for by the appropriate normative analysis.
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“The representativeness heuristic has been argued to account, at least in part, for paranormal beliefs (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002; Lupfer & Layman, 1996; Rogers et al., 2009, 2011; Tobacyk & Wilkinson, 1991).”
BackgroundRisen, J. L. (2016) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000017 · Cited by 221
Why people are reluctant to tempt fate.
Risen, J. L., & Gilovich, T. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.2.293 · Cited by 138
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gilovich, T., & Savitsky, K.
- Venue
- Heuristics and Biases
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2002-07-08
- Pages
- 617-624
- OpenAlex
- W1600671645
- Cited by
- 46
- References
- 166
- FWCI
- 0.60
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gilovich, T., & Savitsky, K. (2002). Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs. Heuristics and Biases. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511808098.036
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