Cited by 138Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsParanormal Experiences and BeliefsPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Why people are reluctant to tempt fate.

Risen, Jane L., Gilovich, Thomas·2008·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

The present research explored the belief that it is bad luck to "tempt fate." Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that people do indeed have the intuition that actions that tempt fate increase the likelihood of negative outcomes. Studies 3-6 examined our claim that the intuition is due, in large part, to the combination of the automatic tendencies to attend to negative prospects and to use accessibility as a cue when judging likelihood. Study 3 demonstrated that negative outcomes are more accessible following actions that tempt fate than following actions that do not tempt fate. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated that the heightened accessibility of negative outcomes mediates the elevated perceptions of likelihood. Finally, Study 6 examined the automatic nature of the underlying processes. The types of actions that are thought to tempt fate as well as the role of society and culture in shaping this magical belief are discussed.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/0022-3514.95.2.293

Cites

63 of 63 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • For the Risen and Gilovich (2008) study, the GPT sample found likelihood estimations were lower when fate was tempted, and did not replicate either the original or Many Labs 2 result.

    “Likelihood estimations were lower when fate was tempted”

    From Diminished diversity-of-thought in a standard large language model (2024) · cites this paper as Risen & Gilovich, 2008

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Risen, J. L., & Gilovich, T.
Affiliations
  • University of Chicago (US)
  • Cornell University (US)
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Published
2008-08
Volume
95
Issue
2
Pages
293-307
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
OpenAlex
W2158547509
Cited by
138
References
61
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 8
FWCI
3.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (SES0542486; SES0241638)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
magical beliefs, intuition, adverse outcomes, probability judgment, automatic cognition, belief in luck
MeSH terms
Culture, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Motivation, Negativism, Probability, Social Environment, Intuition

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review