The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina: A Transactions Cost Approach
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This book develops a general model of public policymaking, focusing on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. By using this model the authors are able to derive a series of empirical propositions about the conditions under which policies are likely to be volatile, rigid, or high quality. In addition, the authors combine the tools of game theory with Williamson's transaction cost theory, North's institutional arguments, and contract theory, to provide a general theory of public policymaking in a comparative political economy setting. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina, using statistical analyses on newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions, rules, incentives and outcomes. Drawing on this research the book explores the reasons for Argentina's seeming inability to design and implement high quality public policies over a sustained period of time.
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Cites
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260580 · Cited by 7,905
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
The institutional environment for economic growth
Henisz, W. J. (2000) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00066 · Cited by 1,651
Cited by
Variation in Institutional Strength
Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756 · Cited by 524
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
Avoiding Governors: The Success of Bolsa Família
Fenwick, T. B. (2009) · Latin American Research Review · doi:10.1353/lar.0.0073 · Cited by 190
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
ALEMÁN, E., CALVO, E., JONES, M. P., & KAPLAN, N. (2009) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298009787500358 · Cited by 125
Metadata
- Authors
- Spiller, P. T., & Tommasi, M.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2007-04-30
- OpenAlex
- W4247779504
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 18.79
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Spiller, P. T., & Tommasi, M. (2007). The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina: A Transactions Cost Approach. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511818219
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.