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Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity
Abstract
When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us.
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Citations
Cited by
Open-mindedness and intellectual humility
Spiegel, J. S. (2012) · Theory and Research in Education · doi:10.1177/1477878512437472 · Cited by 139
When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology
Samuelson, P. L., & Church, I. M. (2015) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.904197 · Cited by 52
Watson, L. (2016) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12316 · Cited by 39
Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance
Kotzee, B., Carter, J. A., & Siegel, H. (2021) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2019.10 · Cited by 37
KOTZEE, B. (2016) · Journal of Philosophy of Education · doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12202 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Greco, J.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2010-04-22
- OpenAlex
- W4230697696
- Cited by
- 730
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 35.53
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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