When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

Samuelson, Peter L.; Church, Ian M.

doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.904197

Cited by 52Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsFeminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

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Samuelson, Peter L., Church, Ian M.·2015·Philosophical Psychology

DOI 10.1080/09515089.2014.904197

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Abstract

In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)—as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation.

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Berber, A. (2022) · Theoria Beograd · doi:10.2298/theo2201103b
A preliminary investigation of intellectual humility as a protective factor for maladaptive personality traits
Penner, F., Bowersox, L., Leavitt, J., & Sharp, C. (2022) · Nordic Psychology · doi:10.1080/19012276.2022.2078993 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Introduction: Populism and the Significance of the Intellectual Virtues
Peterson, G. R., Berhow, M. C., & Tsakiridis, G. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-05785-4_1
Doing Good with Words: The Virtue of Benevolent Persuasiveness
Campos, V. (2023) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2023.29
L’exercici de la ment oberta
Oms, S. (2023) · Convivium · doi:10.1344/conv36.730.45279
The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual‐process virtue
Lindberg, I. M. (2024) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12675
Peran Mediasi Dogmatisme dalam Hubungan antara Need for Closure dan Intellectual Humility
Harifasyah, I., & Sianipar, A. E. (2024) · Jurnal Penelitian dan Pengukuran Psikologi: JPPP · doi:10.21009/jppp.131.04
“…bahwa pengetahuan kita tidak lengkap atau tidak sempurna, dan kita selalu terbuka untuk mempelajari lebih lanjut dan mempertimbangkan sudut pandang yang berbeda (Hopkin et al., 2014; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Leary et al., 2017; Leary, 2018; Samuelson & Church, 2015; Whitcomb et al., 2017).”
Background
Kant on Beauty and Humility
Matherne, S. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198854586.013.32
Psychometric Properties of the spanish translated General Intellectual Humility Scale in a Peruvian samplePreprint
Silva-Alegria, M. E. (2025) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/kz6ba_v1
Cultivating Intellectual Virtues with the Epistemic Benefits of Religious Disagreement
Lougheed, K. (2025) · Philosophia Reformata · doi:10.1163/23528230-bja10110
Humility is the foundation to a virtuous life
Wright, J. (2023) · doi:10.64628/aai.9uh5xaraf
How do intellectually humble people form impressions?: Regulating initial intuitions through reflection
Ökten, I. O., Lombard, J., Harkness, A., & Gullesserian, M. C. (2026) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2026.113729
La Psicología de la Irracionalidad Epistémica: La Teoría de los Dos Procesos
Álvarez-Montero, F. J., Navarro, M. E. S., & López, J. C. L. (2025) · Sekkan · doi:10.68038/txdpas06
“La Tabla 3 muestra algunos de los estimuladores de la irracionalidad epis-témica, que han sido ampliamente estudiados en la literatura (Escolà-Gascón et al., 2020; Rizeq et al., 2021; Samuelson y Church, 2015; Schulz et al., 2020).”

Authors: Samuelson, P. L., & Church, I. M.
Affiliations: Fuller Theological Seminary (US)
Corresponding author: Samuelson, Peter L.
ORCID: Church, Ian M.
Venue: Philosophical Psychology
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Published: 2014-04-03
Volume: 28
Issue: 8
Pages: 1095-1113
ISSN: 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
1465-394X
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2014.904197
OpenAlex: W2110057922
Semantic Scholar: 7970f684c6b03e2b1825f1101101ddc3b8676cce
Cited by: 52
References: 65
Citations by year: 2026: 1 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 3
FWCI: 12.44
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: green
www.research.ed.ac.uk
Licence: other-oa
Locations: Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics: Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords: cognitive heuristics, cognitive biases, virtue epistemology, neo-Aristotelianism, motivation, intellectual humility, intellectual arrogance, intellectual virtues, habits of mind, personality traits

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When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

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