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Cited by 351

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Computing Optimal Randomized Resource Allocations for Massive Security Games

Kiekintveld, Christopher, Jain, Manish, Tsai, Jason, Pita, James, Ordóñez, Fernando, Tambe, Milind·2011·Security and Game Theory

Abstract

Introduction Providing security for transportation systems, computer networks, and other critical infrastructure is a large and growing problem. Central to many of these security problems is a resource allocation task. For example, a police force may have limited personnel to conduct patrols, operate checkpoints, and conduct random searches. Other scarce resources including bomb-sniffing canines, vehicles, and security cameras. The key question is how to efficiently allocate these resources to protect against a wide variety of potential threats. The adversarial aspect of security domains poses unique challenges for resource allocation. A motivated attacker can gather information about security measures using surveillance and plan more effective attacks. Predictable resource allocations may be exploited by an attacker, greatly reducing resource effectiveness. A better approach for deploying security resources is to use randomization to increase the uncertainty of potential attackers. We develop new computational methods that use game-theoretic analysis to generate optimal randomized resource allocations for security domains. Game theory offers a more sophisticated approach to randomization than simply “rolling dice.” It allows the analyst to factor differential risks and values into the game model, and incorporates game-theoretic predictions of how the attacker will respond to a given security policy. Recent work by Paruchuri et al. uses a game-theoretic approach to create randomized security policies for traffic checkpoints and canine patrols at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), which are deployed in the daily airport-security operations (Paruchuri et al., 2008; Pita et al., 2008).

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Metadata

Authors
Kiekintveld, C., Jain, M., Tsai, J., Pita, J., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M.
Venue
Security and Game Theory
Published
2011-12-12
Pages
156-176
OpenAlex
W2107381919
Cited by
351
References
13
FWCI
167.16
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Computing Optimal Randomized Resource Allocations for Massive Security Games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511973031.008
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Kiekintveld, C., Jain, M., Tsai, J., Pita, J., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M. (2011). Computing Optimal Randomized Resource Allocations for Massive Security Games. Security and Game Theory. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511973031.008

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