Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa
Abstract
Why have seemingly similar African countries developed very different forms of democratic party systems? Despite virtually ubiquitous conditions that are assumed to be challenging to democracy - low levels of economic development, high ethnic heterogeneity, and weak state capacity - nearly two dozen African countries have maintained democratic competition since the early 1990s. Yet the forms of party system competition vary greatly: from highly stable, nationally organized, well-institutionalized party systems to incredibly volatile, particularistic parties in systems with low institutionalization. To explain their divergent development, Rachel Beatty Riedl points to earlier authoritarian strategies to consolidate support and maintain power. The initial stages of democratic opening provide an opportunity for authoritarian incumbents to attempt to shape the rules of the new multiparty system in their own interests, but their power to do so depends on the extent of local support built up over time.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Electoral competition frequently produces the opposite of its intended effects in contexts of weak party institutionalization, fragile state capacity, and entrenched neo-patrimonial logics.
“This article examines a foundational paradox in the political science of democratization: electoral competition, long treated as a corrective to corruption and authoritarianism, frequently produces the opposite of its intended effects.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Riedl (2014)
The destabilizing effects of competition are conditional on the depth and programmatic character of party systems.
“Third, following Riedl (2014) and the party institutionalization literature, the destabilizing effects of competition are conditional on the depth and programmatic character of party systems.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Riedl (2014)
Where parties are personalist vehicles rather than institutionalized organizations, competition operates through clientelist mobilization rather than programmatic appeal.
“Where parties are personalist vehicles rather than institutionalized organizations, competition operates through clientelist mobilization rather than programmatic appeal.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Riedl (2014)
In institutionalized systems, competition operates through programmatic appeal, ideological positioning, and policy differentiation.
“In institutionalized systems, competition operates through programmatic appeal, ideological positioning, and policy differentiation.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Riedl (2014)
Institutionalized party systems exhibit stable patterns of inter-party competition, programmatic differentiation among parties, organizational depth that extends beyond the personality of leaders, and rules and norms that constrain elite behavior.
“Institutionalized party systems exhibit several features: stable patterns of inter-party competition, programmatic differentiation among parties, organizational depth that extends beyond the personality of leaders, and rules and norms that constrain elite behavior.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Riedl (2014)
Personalist party systems are organized around the personalities, ethnic identities, and rent-distribution networks of dominant leaders.
“Personalist party systems, by contrast, are organized around the personalities, ethnic identities, and rent-distribution networks of dominant leaders.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Riedl (2014)
The result is a virtuous cycle in which competition reinforces institutionalization.
“The result is a virtuous cycle in which competition reinforces institutionalization.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Riedl (2014)
Cites
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025 · see citing works
Modernization: Theories and Facts
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0004 · Cited by 1,983 · see citing works
Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic
Berman, S. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0008 · Cited by 1,108 · see citing works
POSNER, D. N. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404041334 · Cited by 940 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding
Waldner, D., & Lust, E. (2018) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628 · Cited by 889 · see citing works
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215 · see citing works
Parties, Civil Society, and the Deterrence of Democratic Defection
Bernhard, M., Hicken, A., Reenock, C., & Lindberg, S. I. (2020) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-019-09295-0 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
Critical Event Analysis in Case Study Research
García-Montoya, L., & Mahoney, J. (2023) · Sociological Methods & Research · doi:10.1177/0049124120926201 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Pathways of Democratic Backsliding, Resistance, and (Partial) Recoveries
Riedl, R. B., McCoy, J., Roberts, K., & Somer, M. (2024) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/00027162251319909 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
Self-citationConteh, J. M., & Conteh, A. K. (2026) · European Journal of Political Science Studies · doi:10.46827/ejpss.v9i2.2225
- Authors
- Riedl, R. B.
- Affiliations
- Northwestern University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Riedl, Rachel Beatty
- ORCID
- Riedl, Rachel Beatty
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2014-02-13
- OpenAlex
- W1571595637
- Cited by
- 424
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 64 · 2019: 68 · 2018: 78 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 3
- FWCI
- 20.07
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › African Studies and Ethnography
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Keywords
- democratic transition, multiparty system, democratic opening, party system institutionalization, local support, African democracy, ethnic diversity, state capacity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
