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Cited by 8Philosophical Ethics and TheoryEthics, Aesthetics, and ArtEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Thinking Outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck

Nelkin, Dana Kay·2019·Midwest Studies In Philosophy
DOI 10.1111/misp.12101
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Abstract

The very idea of moral luck poses a puzzle. In fact, Bernard Williams, who introduced the phrase “moral luck,” writes that he “expected to suggest an oxymoron” (Williams 1993: 251). As I will understand it here, moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment, despite the fact that a significant aspect of what he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his control (Nagel 1979). Williams (1981) had suggested that the idea of luck—or being outside of our control—is simply inconsistent with the idea of moral assessment. The more specific claim that will be the focus here is that the idea of luck is inconsistent with a particular form of moral assessment, namely, moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And in fact, I will focus on a specific kind of moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, namely, that associated with moral responsibility understood as accountability. In this sense of responsibility, we are responsible agents insofar as we are subjects of legitimate moral demands and apt candidates for being held to account when it comes to meeting those demands.1

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Crossref · 10.1111/misp.12101

Cites

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Brink David O., Fair Opportunity, Responsibility, and Excuse
  2. Nagel Thomas, 1979, Mortal Questions
  3. Williams Bernard, 1993, Moral Luck, 251

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Authors
Nelkin, D. K.
Corresponding author
Nelkin, Dana Kay
ORCID
Nelkin, Dana Kay
Venue
Midwest Studies In Philosophy
Publisher
Philosophy Documentation Center
Published
2019-07-24
Volume
43
Issue
1
Pages
7-23
ISSN
  • 0363-6550 (ISSN-L)
  • 1475-4975
DOI
10.1111/misp.12101
OpenAlex
W2963168696
Semantic Scholar
44f8548224326ed356c33e516c2d7c1a9e85056f
Cited by
8
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3
FWCI
6.20
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
Midwest Studies in Philosophy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
moral luck, moral responsibility

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