Cited by 1,015Philosophy, Science, and HistoryPhilosophy and History of ScienceDiverse Historical and Scientific Studies

The Nature of a Paradigm

Masterman, Margaret·1970·Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge

Abstract

1. The initial difficulty: Kuhn's multiple definitions of a paradigm . 2. The originality of Kuhn's sociological notion of a paradigm: the paradigm is something which can function when the theory is not there . 3. The philosophic consequence of Kuhn's insistence on the centrality of normal science: philosophically speaking, a paradigm is an artefact which can be used as a puzzle-solving device; not a metaphysical world-view . 4. A paradigm has got to be a concrete ‘picture’ used analogically; because it has got to be a ‘way of seeing’ . 5. Conclusion: preview of the logical characteristics of a paradigm . The purpose of this paper is to elucidate T. S. Kuhn's conception of a paradigm; and it is written on the assumption that T. S. Kuhn is one of the outstanding philosophers of science of our time. It is curious that, up to now, no attempt has been made to elucidate this notion of paradigm, which is central to Kuhn's whole view of science as set out in his [1962]. Perhaps this is because this book is at once scientifically perspicuous and philosophically obscure. It is being widely read, and increasingly appreciated, by actual research workers in the sciences, so that it must be (to a certain extent) scientifically perspicuous. On the other hand, it is being given widely diverse interpretations by philosophers, which gives some reason to think that it is philosophically obscure.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781139171434.008

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Formulations that treat paradigms as world views miss Kuhn's sociology and history of science argument that paradigms are intrinsic to the social functioning of a scientific community.

    “Formulations like these miss the sociology of science and history of science argument by Kuhn (who is admittedly ambiguous on this; Masterman 1970), that paradigms are intrinsic to the social functioning of a scientific community.”

    From The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate (1996) · cites this paper as Masterman 1970

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Masterman, M.
Affiliations
University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
Masterman, Margaret
Venue
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
Published
1970-09-02
Pages
59-90
OpenAlex
W1929134071
Cited by
1,015
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 68 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 28
FWCI
33.14
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Diverse Historical and Scientific Studies
Keywords
paradigm, Thomas Kuhn, normal science, scientific revolution, philosophy of science, analogical reasoning

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review