The Nature of a Paradigm
Abstract
1. The initial difficulty: Kuhn's multiple definitions of a paradigm . 2. The originality of Kuhn's sociological notion of a paradigm: the paradigm is something which can function when the theory is not there . 3. The philosophic consequence of Kuhn's insistence on the centrality of normal science: philosophically speaking, a paradigm is an artefact which can be used as a puzzle-solving device; not a metaphysical world-view . 4. A paradigm has got to be a concrete ‘picture’ used analogically; because it has got to be a ‘way of seeing’ . 5. Conclusion: preview of the logical characteristics of a paradigm . The purpose of this paper is to elucidate T. S. Kuhn's conception of a paradigm; and it is written on the assumption that T. S. Kuhn is one of the outstanding philosophers of science of our time. It is curious that, up to now, no attempt has been made to elucidate this notion of paradigm, which is central to Kuhn's whole view of science as set out in his [1962]. Perhaps this is because this book is at once scientifically perspicuous and philosophically obscure. It is being widely read, and increasingly appreciated, by actual research workers in the sciences, so that it must be (to a certain extent) scientifically perspicuous. On the other hand, it is being given widely diverse interpretations by philosophers, which gives some reason to think that it is philosophically obscure.
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Formulations that treat paradigms as world views miss Kuhn's sociology and history of science argument that paradigms are intrinsic to the social functioning of a scientific community.
“Formulations like these miss the sociology of science and history of science argument by Kuhn (who is admittedly ambiguous on this; Masterman 1970), that paradigms are intrinsic to the social functioning of a scientific community.”
From The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate (1996) · cites this paper as Masterman 1970
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Kruglanski, A. W., & Ajzen, I. (1983) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420130102 · Cited by 346 · see citing works
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- Authors
- Masterman, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Masterman, Margaret
- Venue
- Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1970-09-02
- Pages
- 59-90
- OpenAlex
- W1929134071
- Cited by
- 1,015
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 68 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 33.14
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Diverse Historical and Scientific Studies
- Keywords
- paradigm, Thomas Kuhn, normal science, scientific revolution, philosophy of science, analogical reasoning
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