The DOI matches its Crossref record; 262 of the 262 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Abstract
Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different “consciousnesses.” Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of “consciousness” based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct “guesses.” They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are both access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of accessconsciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness.
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In the citing paper
“In this case, relying on reports may lead us to misidentify the neural basis of access as that of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995(Block , 2007)).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Block 1995
In the citing paper
“To illustrate, it is currently debated whether conscious states, by definition, need to be reportable (Block 1995; Lamme 2006; Tsuchiya et al. 2015a; Pitts et al. 2018).”
From An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science (2022) · cites this paper as Block 1995
In the citing paper
“- (1)Flexible value systems and goals that reflect or give rise to the motivational values of the organism’s ever-changing internal states and actions (e.g., Block, 1995; Panksepp, 2005; Denton, 2006; Damasio, 2010; Dickinson, 2010).”
From The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning (2016) · cites this paper as Block, 1995
In the citing paper
“GWT (Baars, 1993, 2005) is a framework proposed to formalize access consciousness—the idea that what is conscious is information that is accessible across various mental processes (Block, 1995).”
From Design and evaluation of a global workspace agent embodied in a realistic multimodal environment (2024) · cites this paper as Block, 1995
In the citing paper
“As lack of insight into illness is dysfunctional in terms of prognosis [ 49 ] and failure to self-medicate [ 50 ], one function of metacognition may be to promote on-going monitoring and control to the level of explicit awareness (cf. Block's ‘monitoring’ consciousness, [ 34 ]), thus allowing self-referential decisions to be made.”
From Metacognition: computation, biology and function (2012) · cites this paper as [34]
Citations
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Cited by
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498
“We wonder whether these distinctions may suf®ce to capture the intuitions behind Ned Block's (Block, 1995; see also Block, this volume) de®nitions of phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness.”
BackgroundFacing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis.
Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2006) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.297 · Cited by 1,417
“The phenomenal aspect refers to the qualitative (Natsoulas, 1981), the experiential (Block, 1995), or the nonrepresentational property (Eilan, 1998) of awareness, also known as “immediate qualia” (Tolman, 1922).”
BackgroundInfluentialGallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2007) · doi:10.4324/9780203086599 · Cited by 1,512
Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, Ned
- ORCID
- Block, Ned
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1995-06
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 227-247
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2164446969
- Cited by
- 3,364
- References
- 261
- Citations by year
- 2026: 225 · 2025: 216 · 2024: 254 · 2023: 231 · 2022: 124 · 2021: 168 · 2020: 182 · 2019: 336 · 2018: 158 · 2017: 108 · 2016: 66 · 2015: 99 · 2014: 93 · 2013: 90 · 2012: 111
- FWCI
- 28.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
- CogPrints (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, blindsight, blind field, function of consciousness, action guidance, representational content
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