The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Corporate Governance and Competition
Abstract
Introduction In most countries, managers of corporations are legally responsible to the shareholders. In their seminal contribution on the separation of ownership and control, Berle and Means (1932) argue that in practice managers do not pursue the interests of shareholders. Instead they pursue their own interests, which results in waste and inefficiency. The contrast between the legal rights of shareholders and the de facto control of managers highlighted by Berle and Means led to the development of the agency approach to corporate governance (see, among others, Coase 1937; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983a,b; and Hart 1995). An excellent survey is contained in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The agency theory of corporate governance focuses on the question: “How can shareholders ensure that managers pursue the shareholders' interests.” We argue that this focus is much too narrow. A comparison of governance mechanisms in different countries and in different sectors of the economy suggests that an alternative approach is called for. In Section 2, we review the actual operation of corporate governance in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan. In the United States and United Kingdom, the mechanisms for ensuring that managers operate in the interests of shareholders are the strongest. The main internal governance system is the board of directors; the main external governance system is the market for corporate control. The effectiveness of both mechanisms has been widely questioned.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Law, finance, and economic growth in China
ALLEN, F., QIAN, J., & QIAN, M. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.010 · Cited by 4,446
Self-citationCompetition and Financial Stability
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2004) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2004.0038 · Cited by 1,137
Self-citationFirm Innovation in Emerging Markets: The Role of Finance, Governance, and Competition
Ayyagari, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2011) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109011000378 · Cited by 911
Amran, A., Lee, S. P., & Devi, S. S. (2014) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.1767 · Cited by 742
Lehmann, E., & Weigand, J. (2000) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1023/a:1009896709767 · Cited by 403
Metadata
- Authors
- Allen, F., & Gale, D.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-10-02
- Pages
- 23-94
- ISSN
- 1472-0701 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1482948273
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 90.09
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate Governance and Competition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781139175333.003
- The paper
- Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000). Corporate Governance and Competition. Corporate Governance. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139175333.003
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.