Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 197

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate Control

Hellwig, Martin·2000·Corporate Governance

Abstract

Introduction The purpose of this essay is to call for a reassessment of the significance of corporate finance for corporate control and for a reorientation of the theory of corporate governance. The long-running repertory play “Banks versus Markets” should be taken off the playbill for a while, to be replaced perhaps by a new offering “Career Patterns, Intrigues, and Resource Allocation in Insider Systems with Mutual Interdependence.” According to the recent authoritative survey by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” Through suitable governance mechanisms, “advanced countries … have assured the flow of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.” This view rests on the notions that (i) the corporate sector needs external funds for investment, (ii) the financial system channels such funds to the corporate sector from the household sector, and (iii) in this system the interests of external providers of funds are safeguarded through control rights giving them scope for interfering with management misbehavior. With this view of corporate governance, the literature has studied the incentive implications of different governance mechanisms for company management and financiers. Attention has focused in particular on the free-rider problem that arises if a company has many outside financiers and the resources that any one of them devotes to monitoring and controlling the company's management provides benefits to all of them jointly.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781139175333.004

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Cited by

See all 197

Metadata

Authors
Hellwig, M.
Venue
Corporate Governance
Published
2000-10-02
Pages
95-136
ISSN
1472-0701 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1851996474
Cited by
197
References
1
FWCI
116.24
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate Control. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781139175333.004
The paper
Hellwig, M. (2000). On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate Control. Corporate Governance. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139175333.004

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.