Examining the monological nature of conspiracy theories
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
(Summary prepared for this repository). This chapter critically examines the often made claim that endorsement of conspiracy theories is characteristic of a "monological" world view (Goertzel, 1994) - in which claims about the causes of an event are not weighed against specific evidence about the event itself so much as abstract, mutually supportive beliefs about the pattern of previous events. Although beliefs in various conspiracy theories are robustly correlated, so that people who believe in one conspiracy theory are likely to believe in several others, this does not in itself demonstrate that conspiracy beliefs are rooted in, or symptomatic of, a monological worldview. There is little evidence to suggest the mindsets of adherents of conspiracy theories are generally more monological - in fact, some research suggests that 'conspiracy theorists' are more open, rather than more closed, to new ideas. Further, some conspiracy theories contradict, rather than reinforce, other conspiracy theories, suggesting that they do not comprise a closed ecosystem of mutually supportive ideas. The authors outline other accounts of why beliefs in various conspiracy theories tend to cluster together. For example, these beliefs are associated with similar personality variables, beliefs about the self, and beliefs about the world. Also explaining their correlation, they may be best viewed not as separate psychological variables but as facets of an underlying variable. The authors conclude that further research is needed to test some of the interesting predictions that may be derived from the monological worldview position. In the meantime, to portray conspiracy belief as a symptom of a monological world view is not yet warranted empirically, and may be unfairly derogatory.
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Cites
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Self-citationDead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories
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Cited by
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511
Self-citationBelief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain
van Prooijen, J., & Douglas, K. M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2530 · Cited by 483
Self-citationPrevention is better than cure: addressing anti-vaccine conspiracy theories
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2017) · Journal of Applied Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/jasp.12453 · Cited by 446
“…2015; Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016; Douglas & Sutton, 2008, 2011, 2015; Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Goertzel, 1994; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Sutton & Douglas, 2014; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012).”
Self-citationCastanho Silva, B., Vegetti, F., & Littvay, L. (2017) · Swiss Political Science Review · doi:10.1111/spsr.12270 · Cited by 435
Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., Callan, M. J., Dawtry, R. J., & Harvey, A. J. (2016) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2015.1051586 · Cited by 414
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Metadata
- Authors
- Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M.
- Venue
- Power, Politics, and Paranoia
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2014-05-29
- Pages
- 254-272
- OpenAlex
- W2257811459
- Cited by
- 139
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 39.29
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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