The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
T HEORIES OF D ELEGATION
Abstract
▪ Abstract We survey modern models of delegation that assume a boss and a subordinate pursue their own goals. Among the major themes covered are the following: the conditions under which the boss will prefer to delegate versus those in which she will prefer to retain authority; how a boss can induce a subordinate to truthfully reveal information; when rational principals will use the ally principle (i.e. delegate to agents with similar goals); delegation in repeated interactions; and how delegation can overcome commitment problems. These themes are relevant to a wide variety of institutions, affecting intralegislative organization, executive-legislative relations, and central banks.
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Cites
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The Science of “Muddling Through”
Lindblom, C. E. (1959) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.2307/973677 · Cited by 8,513
Nielsen, R. P., & Axelrod, R. (1985) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257983 · Cited by 6,321
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
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Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036930 · Cited by 2,224
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Information and Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, K. (1991) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.8850 · Cited by 1,718
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
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Cited by
The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security
Avant, D. D. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490866 · Cited by 507
Baird, A., & Maruping, L. M. (2021) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2021/15882 · Cited by 512
Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set
Garriga, A. C. (2016) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813 · Cited by 411
Are innovative, participatory and deliberative procedures in policy making democratic and effective?
Papadopoulos, Y., & Warin, P. (2007) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00696.x · Cited by 395
Drift and conversion: hidden faces of institutional change
Hacker, J. S., Pierson, P., & Thelen, K. (2015) · Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316273104.008 · Cited by 393
Metadata
- Authors
- Bendor, J., Glazer, A., & Hammond, T.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2001-06
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 235-269
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2157821211
- Cited by
- 450
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 7.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
