The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
Abstract
Why has IMF lending achieved such poor results in Africa? Is it because the Fund imposes the wrong conditions, or because it fails to enforce them? Analysis of monthly data on 53 African countries from 1990 to 2000 shows that the IMF's loans-for-reform contract lacks credibility because donor countries intervene to prevent rigorous enforcement. Countries that have influence with developed-country patrons—as measured by U.S. foreign aid, membership in postcolonial international institutions, and voting profiles in the UN—are subject to less rigorous enforcement (shorter program suspensions). They have more frequent program suspensions, because they violate their conditions more often. The IMF will have to become more independent in order to become an effective champion of reform.
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Cites
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Schafer, J. L. (1999) · Statistical Methods in Medical Research · doi:10.1177/096228029900800102 · Cited by 3,949
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions
Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (1996) · doi:10.1515/9780691188010 · Cited by 516
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The relevance of political affinity for the initial acquisition premium in cross‐border acquisitions
Bertrand, O., Betschinger, M., & Settles, A. (2016) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2438 · Cited by 191
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A Thousand Cuts: Social Protection in the Age of Austerity
Kentikelenis, A., & Stubbs, T. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190637736.001.0001 · Cited by 94
Metadata
- Authors
- STONE, R. W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 577-591
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2107169610
- Cited by
- 474
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 22.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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